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ABSTRACT

DISASTER COMMUNICATION NETWORKS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE THAI RED CROSS AND ITS DISASTER COMMUNICATION
RESPONSE TO THE ASIAN TSUNAMI

Tami Jean Matthews

Department of Communications
Master of Arts

Disaster victims and vulnerable populations are audiences that communications
professionals and scholars have ignored. Public relation practices dominate current
disaster communication policy. This study examines the disaster communication
network, including policy and practice, of the Thai Red Cross, before, during, and
after the Asian tsunami.
Disaster communication(s) is defined as the sharing and exchange of
information with the victims immediately affected by a disaster. This definition
focuses specifically on the vulnerable audience and allows response efforts to emerge
from multiple disciplines. Focusing response efforts on victims’ assessed needs and
abilities allows for a multi-disciplinary approach to mitigate further suffering. The

disciplines of health, development, and communications converge for efficient
disaster management.
This case study provides great insight into the cultural chasm between policy
making and practical application and also reveals the value of personal initiative to
solve problems after a disaster. A proposed model of disaster communication is
offered. Significantly more research is needed in the area of disaster
communications.
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Disaster Communication Networks 1
Chapter 1 Introduction
Sunday, December 26, 2004, is etched into the minds and hearts of those who
stood as witnesses to the terrible aftermath of the South East Asia Tsunami. The world
watched in horror as images of gigantic walls of water washed over majestic beachfronts.
The waves indiscriminately swept away life and livelihood, leaving a humanitarian crisis
in their wake. Moved with compassion and duty, non-profit groups, government
agencies, civil agencies, and private individuals responded with urgency to relieve the
suffering. Within one hour of the 40-foot wall of water hitting the beaches of Khao Lak,
Thailand, the Thai Red Cross Society (TRC) was mobilizing relief efforts. There was a
great outpouring of humanitarian assistance from around the globe.
The World Health Organization (WHO) reported some undesirable side effects
resulting from the humanitarian impulse (Sondorp & Bornemisza, 2005). One major side
effect mentioned was the inability of health agencies to meet the immediate needs of the
victims because manpower was diverted to manage the overabundance of donated
resources, much of which was inappropriate for the immediate needs of the victims.
A mega-disaster such as the Asian tsunami has not been seen in modern times,
though it has been reported that the occurrence and scale of natural disasters are on the
rise (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Disaster Management,
2004). With an urgency to improve disaster response, the WHO recognized that disaster
communications research was needed to enhance coordinated responses and “to find
better ways to communicate the right information at the right time to the right audience”
(Sondorp & Bornemisza, 2005).
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Within the discipline of communications, disaster communications has been
referred to as the public relations (PR) management of a disaster. Ranging from image
control policies of humanitarian organizations to informing the general public about
disasters and soliciting donations (International Committee of the Red Cross,
Communications Guide, 2003), PR definitely holds a significant place in the response
effort. However, a disaster is multi-dimensional by definition (International
Telecommunications Union, 1998). A disaster does not affect only one area of a person’s
life; it affects several aspects simultaneously. Therefore, disaster response, from within
the field of communications, must extend beyond the lone boundary of traditional public
relations and incorporate additional disciplines and dimensions. While significant
attention has been placed on fundraising and informing distant audiences of the disaster
situation, both academic and PR communications communities have given little attention
to the study or importance of information exchanges between the audience most
vulnerable after a disaster: the victims (Morley, 2005).
Communicating directly with the disaster victims serves several important
purposes such as allowing for exchange of vital information (concerning issues of health,
available resources, needs, etc.) that will guide coordination efforts to meet the needs of
those victims. When a vulnerable audience is forgotten (even as disaster management and
relief agencies follow written “communications” policies), communication breakdown
can or will lead to a greater tragedy and unnecessary losses (Halpern, 2005; Noji, 2005b).
A prime example of this was the aftermath of the August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina,
and the people of New Orleans (Comfort, 2005). Relief agencies may have followed
their communications guides; however, the victims were left helpless—showing again the
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need to improve scholarship and practices of those communicating during and after a
disaster.
Disaster communications has a broad and fluid definition. Obviously, the phrase
is related to both the principles of communication and the aspects of a disaster. The
phrase is utilized in many different ways. For example disaster telecommunications has
been defined by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as any “transmission,
emission or reception” of information, media, or messages through the use of electronic
or electromagnetic devices to monitor or mitigate the effects of a “serious disruption of
the functioning of a society” (International Telecommunications Union, 1998).
For the purposes of this thesis, disaster communications is defined as: the sharing
and exchange of information with the victims immediately affected by the disaster. This
definition of disaster communications specifically relates to an audience that has been
largely forgotten by communications scholars and PR professionals. The victims are the
most vulnerable audience following a disaster; therefore, disaster response efforts must
focus on meeting victims’ needs by mitigating further compromise to their lives and
livelihoods (Sondorp & Bornemisza, 2005). Open and direct communication between the
victims and the disaster response agencies is imperative for coordinated and appropriate
response efforts.
The objective of this case study was to examine the disaster communications
policies and practices of the TRC before, during and after the Asian tsunami. The lens of
this study was focused specifically on the TRC’s communications efforts with the victims
immediately affected by the tsunami. It was anticipated that the disaster communication
policies and practices would be assessed based on the principles of both diffusion and
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participatory theories. However, as the case study evolved, deeper questioning guided
the research beyond the questions of “how” things happened and into inquiry of “why”
things did or did not happen. This thesis will show not only the importance of disaster
communications in relation to disaster victims, but also the great need for more research
in this area.
This study was conducted using qualitative fact-finding methods. Information
was gathered via interviews with TRC personnel at all levels of the Thai National Society
of the Red Cross including volunteer fieldworkers, the Provincial President of Phang Nga
and administration officials at TRC headquarters in Bangkok, Thailand. Additional
information was acquired through field observations and web-based research. The
researcher kept personal field notes including contextual meanings, thoughts, impressions
and observations.
The goal of this research reflects the philosophy espoused by Henry Dunant,
founder of the Red Cross. Dunant started the humanitarian movement after the
publication of his thought-provoking journal depicting the atrocity of war. Initially
reluctant, Dunant was persuaded to publish his personal notes with a single hope that
others might be motivated and moved upon to offer their assistance with compassion for
all humanity. The following statement is Dunant’s plea:
But if these pages could bring up the question (or lead to its being developed and
its urgency realized) of the help to be given to the wounded soldiers in wartime,
or of the first aid to be afforded them after an engagement—if they could attract
the attention of the humane and philanthropically inclined—in a word, if the
consideration and study of this infinitely important subject could, by bringing
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about some small progress, lead to improvement in a condition of things in which
advance and improvement can never be too great, even in the best-organized
armies, I shall have fully attained my goal. (Dunant, 1862/1939, pg. 55)
Likewise, if the study of disaster communications, this equally and infinitely important
subject, can bring about some progress to alleviate the suffering of the vulnerable, the
author shall have fully attained her goal.
This thesis will progress as follows. Chapter two will give an overview of the
Red Cross and its different entities along with a literature review of theories. The
research questions will also be introduced in this chapter. Chapter three explains the
methodology of this case study. Chapter four lists the findings. And chapter five offers a
discussion on those findings and insight to their meanings. Chapter five will conclude
with a proposed model for disaster communication and a call to action for a multidisciplined approach to further research in this area of disaster response.
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Chapter 2 Background and Literature Review
This chapter first provides a brief history of the Red Cross and situates the Thai
Red Cross society within the International Red Cross organization or “Movement,” as it
is known. An understanding of the organization and history provides a basis for the rest
of the case study. As part of the description of the history and organization, the chapter
also explains the standards set forth by the Red Cross for disaster relief and
communication. The second part of this chapter looks at development communications,
focusing on diffusion of innovations and participatory communication models. It then
relates these models to the health communication literature. The literature review reveals
the need for research into disaster communications, both to analyze the effectiveness of
such specialized communication and to develop models for use in future disasters. The
chapter ends by detailing the research questions that guide this study.
History of the Red Cross
Henry Dunant and the origin of Memories of Solferino
J. Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross, was born in Geneva, in 1828, to a
family known for their public service and philanthropic activities. A banker by trade and
a civil servant by heart, Dunant continued in his family’s traditions of philanthropic
activities and visiting the sick and the poor (Dunant, 1862/1939).
In the early summer of 1859, Dunant was traveling in Northern Italy, along the
neutral war zone of the Franco-Austrian War. He came upon the horrifying scene left
after 300,000 troops faced one another in battle. In a 12.5 mile (20.1 km) stretch of
broken land more than 40,000 troops lay dead, dying or wounded. The dying and
wondered solders, of many different nationalities, were heaped together in make-shift
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communal infirmaries at local churches, private residences, public buildings and even
barns. There was a significant lack of medical staff to answer the desperate cries for
help, cries for water and crying out for relief of pain. Such a distressing scene moved
Dunant to action. He moved from one wounded soldier to another, moistening lips and
providing small acts of charity for all, in their last moments of mortality. Dunant was
greatly affected by the scene before him and he later wrote:
The feeling one has of one's own utter inadequacy in such extraordinary and
solemn circumstances is unspeakable. It is, indeed distressing to realize that you
can never do more than help those who are just before you…The moral sense of
the importance of human life; the humane desire to lighten a little the torments of
all these poor wretches, or restore their shattered courage; the furious and
relentless activity which a man summons up at such moments: all these combine
to create a kind of energy which gives one a positive craving to relieve as many as
one can (Dunant, 1862/1939, p. 55).
There was a great necessity for more hands to dress wounds or lift water cups to
the lips of the weak and the weary. With the small towns completely inundated, there
was confusion and panic rising amid the townsfolk. Dunant (1862/1939) notes,
“Somehow or other a volunteer service had to be organized; but this was very difficult
amid the disorder” (p. 45). He was successful in marshalling the help of local women
and the humanitarian service commenced.
Although there were more helping hands, the relief efforts were haphazard and
without prioritization. Dunant noted, “The Lombard women went first to those who cried
the loudest—not always the worst cases. I sought to organize as best I could relief in
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quarters where it seemed to be most lacking…” (p. 49). Dunant localized the group’s
efforts to a church closest to the battlefield where hundreds upon hundreds of soldiers lay
in desperate need of help. The first priority was to provide fresh water to relieve the
suffering soldiers’ thirst. Fresh gauze, ointment and bandages were obtained and used to
dress and redress wounds. Dunant used his own money to buy beef tea, citrus fruits,
herbs and medicine that would sooth the pains.
Regardless of their nationality, Dunant offered the same kindness and care to all
who were suffering. The women, impressed by Dunant’s example, followed his lead in
caring for the soldiers and repeatedly stated, “Tutti fratelli” [All are brothers], a founding
principle that continues to serve as a guide in directing the work of the Red Cross
(Dunant, 1862/1939, p. 54; International Committee of the Red Cross, Communication
Guide, 2003).
In 1862, Dunant recorded his witness to the effects of war, suffering and
humanity in his memoirs titled Un Souvenir de Solferino [Memories of Solferino]. His
simple memoir of the war was published and distributed among the philanthropically
minded and ultimately lead to the creation of the Red Cross.
Dunant’s literary work created a significant stir throughout the world. Public
opinion for permanent volunteer societies, which would render humanitarian service
without distinction of nationality, during times of war, increased and eventually resulted
in a world conference. With 36 delegates representing 14 nations, the first world
conference took place in Geneva, Switzerland, on October 26-29, 1863. During this
conference the International Committee was established; comprised of five individuals,
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these delegates resolved to carry forth the resolutions and recommendations of the
Committee to their individual countries.
The next year, a second international meeting was held; this time called the
Geneva Convention, a treaty was framed and signed by 16 governments. The convention
concluded with the development of 10 articles based on seven principles upon which the
international organization would base its actions. These articles and principles are said to
be the birth certificate of the International Red Cross (Dunant, 1862/1939). The original
seven principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service,
unity and universality continue to guide all entities of the Red Cross today. (See
Appendix A).
International Committee of the Red Cross
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was the first organized
component of the Red Cross. The ICRC is located in Dunant’s hometown of Geneva,
Switzerland. It is the governing body during times of conflict and war, and it specializes
in International Humanitarian Law (IHL), restoring family links and conflict
preparedness and response (International Committee of the Red Cross, Relationship,
2002; International Committee of the Red Cross, Seville Act, 1997). The ICRC must
remain independent of all governments. This independence allows an unbiased
assessment of human rights issues within governments.
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Other entities of the Red Cross evolved as the utility of the guiding principles
extended into additional contexts of humanity and service. Dunant first addressed the
idea of extending the reach of the society’s mission in the third edition of the Un
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Souvenir de Solferino [Memory of Solferino] saying, “these Societies could even give
great service during periods of epidemics or in disasters such as floods and fires…”
(Dunant, 1862/1939, p. 7), however, it was not until 1919 that the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) was founded.
Also located in Geneva, Switzerland, “the International Federation is the largest
humanitarian organization in the world with 183 member Red Cross and Red Crescent
societies, a Secretariat in Geneva and more than 60 delegations placed worldwide to
support its activities” (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Society, Who We Are, 2005, ¶ 2). The Federation's mission is to “improve the lives of
vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity” (International Federation of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, Who We Are, 2005, ¶ 3).
Vulnerable people are often those affected by natural disasters, suffer from poverty,
are of refugee status or are victims of health emergencies (International Federation of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, Who We Are, 2005). Therefore, the Federation
concentrates its humanitarian efforts in four main areas: promotion of humanitarian
values, disaster preparedness, disaster response, health and community care (International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, What We Do, 2005). It carries
out these efforts through cooperative efforts with national societies.
National Societies
National societies carry out their humanitarian activities utilizing both
professional staff and trained volunteers. Activities are organized according to local
needs and subject to national statutes and in accord to national law (International
Committee of the Red Cross, Relationship, 2002; International Committee of the Red
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Cross, Seville Act, 1997). Although the national societies are independent, the activities
of both the ICRC and the IFRC are largely supported by the national Red Cross society of
the country in which the service is rendered. The national Red Cross works closely with
both the ICRC and the IFRC for disaster preparedness and response activities
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Relationship, 2002; International Federation
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, What We Do, 2005; International Committee
of the Red Cross, Seville Act, 1997).
The Movement
The ICRC, IFRC and the national societies are all autonomous organizations,
independent from all other components of the Red Cross. So, what is the relationship
between the ICRC, IFRC and the national societies? According to the ICRC
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Relationship, 2002) all these components of
the Red Cross constitute the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement or “the
Movement.” Individual components of the Red Cross are related to other components
only in their purpose. Their individual actions and activities stem from the Fundamental
Principles (Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity,
and Universality) and an overall mission statement of the Movement. The mission of the
Movement is
To prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found, to protect life
and health and ensure respect for the human being, in particular in times of armed
conflict and other emergencies, to work for the prevention of disease and for the
promotion of health and social welfare, to encourage voluntary service and a
constant readiness to give help by the members of the Movement, and a universal
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sense of solidarity towards all those in need of its protection and assistance.
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Mission of the Movement, 2003, ¶ 5)
To date, the Movement is composed of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and a
total of 183 national societies (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Society, Who We Are, Movement, 2005; International Committee of the Red
Cross, Movement, 2006).
Thai Red Cross Society
A Brief History
The Thai Red Cross Society (TRC) is one of the 183 national societies members
of the Movement. This society has a lengthy history. First called the Red Unalom
Society of Siam, it was founded by King Chulalongkorn (reigning from 1868-1910) on
April 26, 1893. The King appointed Her Majesty Queen Saovabha Pongsri as the first
president of the society, and this tradition of the Queen being president is still upheld
today. The society was organized as a response to relieve the suffering of soldiers
involved in conflicts along the borders of Thailand and French Indochina. Their first
humanitarian action was to send food, supplies and clothing to their soldiers.
Activities of the society were broadened during the subsequent reign of King
Vajravudh (1910-1925) to include health care, disease prevention and relief services. In
1920, the TRC was officially recognized by the ICRC and a year later was accepted as a
member of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Thai Red Cross Society,
At a Glance, n.d.). The TRC states, “Today the TRC constitutes a major network of
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health care and relief services. It is by far, the largest humanitarian organization in the
country” (At a Glance, n.d. pg 4-5) (See Appendix B).
The Mission of the TRC
The mission of the TRC aligns with the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross
and mirrors the mission of the Movement. The Mission Statement of the TRC is:
The Thai Red Cross Society (TRCS)…promotes the ideals of the Red Cross and
of the International Humanitarian Law, to alleviate human suffering, and provides
health services to the most vulnerable including children, women, the aged and
the disabled. The activities of the TRC are focused in four areas: medical and
health services, disaster preparedness and response, blood transfusion services
and promotion of the quality of life of vulnerable people…It seeks to alleviate
human suffering and improve the life of common people…It strives to build a
dynamic organization, enhancing the quality of its services through good
governance and management, and capacity building to reach vulnerable people in
times of needs. (At a Glance, n.d., p. 6)
The Structure and Organization of the Thai Red Cross
Today, the TRC is still closely associated with the Royal Family. According to
the TRC (At a Glance, n.d.), “The Society is under the patronage of H.M. King Bhumibol
Adulyadej with H.M. Queen Sirikit as president and H.R.H. princess Maha Chakri
Sirindhorn as executive vice-president” (p. 7).
The royal family is involved and visible within the TRC, however, they do not
control the society (See Appendix C). The highest governing body of the TRC is known
as the council. The council is comprised of 20 members that are appointed by the king
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for a four year term to oversee the operations of the Society and make decisions
concerning budget, development plans, modification of Statutes, and appointments of
officials to certain positions. Twelve Provincial TRC representatives attend the council
meetings as ex-officio council members in addition to the 20 members appointed by the
King.
Management of the society is under an executive committee with the day-to-day
management of affairs conducted by the director committee. This committee is
comprised of the secretary general, the treasurer and the heads of bureaus.
There are 13 bureaus within the TRC and they are classified as either an
operations or support bureau according to their function. Operations bureaus include
three medical institutions, the National Blood Center, the Red Cross Nursing College,
and the Relief and Community Health Bureau. The support bureaus include
administration, central, finance, fund raising, personnel, youth and volunteers (See
Appendix C).
It is important to have a general understanding of the entire structure and
organization of the TRC because this general knowledge will provide a context from
which to look as the TRC disaster response system. Different tasks and activities of the
TRC are carried out through its many institutions, specialized centers and bureaus.
Within the country, there is a network of 75 Provincial Chapters that support the
diversified activities and tasks of the TRC.
Relief and Community Health Bureau
Disaster preparation and response falls under the responsibility of the Relief and
Community Health Bureau. This bureau is classified as an operational bureau; however,
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the entire national disaster response system incorporates the services of both the
operational and support bureaus of the TRC, additional government agencies and NGOs.
National disaster response is coordinated by the Asian Disaster Preparedness
Center (ADPC) located in Bangkok. The ADPC is a non-profit organization that
supports safer communities by implementing disaster reduction programs. It also assists
governments in developing and implementing disaster management and response
policies. The TRC and the ministry of interior are listed as participating members of the
ADPC (2005) (See Appendix D). However, the Prime Minister of Thailand and the Thai
Ministry of Interior (2005) oversee all disaster response within Thailand (See Appendix
E).
There is significant overlap of disaster response responsibilities between the
operational and support bureaus and government agencies. However, this thesis will deal
only with the Relief and Community Health Bureau as it is responsible for disaster
preparedness and response activities for the TRC. As stated above, a general
understanding of the disaster response system of the TRC adds a context from which to
assess the disaster communications policies and responses of the Relief and Community
Health Bureau of the TRC to the South East Asia Tsunami. No attempt will be made to
dissect, study and analyze the entire TRC disaster response system, which incorporates a
plethora of internal and external entities and government agencies.
Conflict within the Movement and the Seville Agreement
As a Red Cross entity, the TRC has embodied the same fundamental principles
and maintained a comparable mission statement to other international and national Red
Cross entities within the Movement. Yet, despite the unified outward appearance of
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Movement members, internal struggles and conflict began to brew. In the 1990s,
members of the Movement jockeyed for position to fulfill and accomplish certain Red
Cross activities. This led to competition between Movement members and duplication of
efforts. Territorialism encroached on the humanitarian spirit, illustrating a definite lack
of collaboration within the Movement. In 1997, this issue was brought before the Council
of Delegates meeting in Seville, Spain. It was at this conference, on November 26, 1997,
that The Seville Agreement was adopted by consensus and initiated a collaborative spirit
throughout the Movement (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Society, Communications Guide, 2003).
The Seville Agreement provided much more than an operational management tool
or statement of understanding. As cooperation and collaboration between all Movement
members was deemed vital to the global humanitarian mission of the Movement, the
preamble to the Seville Agreement states that every member of the Movement is to be
valued as a partner in the whole humanitarian enterprise (International Committee of the
Red Cross, Seville Act, 1997). The Seville Agreement defined roles and responsibilities
for each component, but also calls for celebration when individual entities provide
additional competencies and greater contributions for the benefit of the entire Movement.
The Seville Agreement called for an overwhelming collaborative spirit; it set into
motion a complete change in attitude toward, and relationship between, Movement
members. These changes allowed for the building of mutual trust, a sense of identity and
shared responsibility throughout the Movement (International Committee of the Red
Cross, Seville Act, 1997).
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Throughout the Red Cross, the Seville Agreement has become a living document
of collaboration and cooperation. It provided the Movement with a framework that could
enhance the efforts of all and provided the world with a unified image of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent players. The ICRC, all international federations and national societies
are provided a guideline in the Seville Agreement by which they can coordinate their
efforts and collaborate on activities to further the mission of the Movement.
Issues of Communications within the Seville Agreement
The Seville Agreement covers many topics necessary for collaboration between all
entities of the Movement. Specifically related to communications are Articles 6 and 9 of
the Seville Agreement. Article 6 offers guidelines by which the lead agency will act as
spokesman, not only for their component, but for the entire Movement. Article 9
addresses issues of public relations and information exchange. Article 9.1 directs
component members to “harmonize their activities so as to present a common image of
the Movement and contribute to a greater understanding of the Movement by the public”
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Seville Act, 1997, Article 9.1.1). “In order to
ensure maximum efficiency in advocating humanitarian principles…the components of
the Movement shall cooperate in coordinating campaigns and developing communication
tools” (International Committee of the Red Cross, Seville Act, 1997, Article 9.1.2).
These agreement articles identify the necessity to communicate efficiently with the
public within the movement, and also with those who are the recipients of the service
rendered by the Red Cross. The communication section of the Seville Agreement asked
for uniform public relations and image control about the Movement, for better
coordination of activities within the Movement, and for the development of
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communication tools to be used to attain maximum project efficiency.
Whether in peace and tranquility or surrounded by disaster and despair, as of 1997,
the Movement had been called upon to develop and have available communication tools
that would maximize the humanitarian effects of Red Cross activities. It appears these
articles of the Seville Agreement were asking in part for disaster communications to be
developed and defined so that agencies would have improved coordination of efforts
through communication processes specific to natural disasters, humanitarian
emergencies, or any other event to which the Red Cross responds.
Cooperation Within the Movement
In 1999, at the 27th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
in Geneva, the Movement adopted a plan of action that formally initiated the
“cooperation” called for by the Seville Agreement of 1997. The focus of the plan of
action was placed upon cooperation among the Movement members and also to improve
the care and protection of victims and vulnerable groups of armed conflict and disasters
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Plan of Action, 1999).
There were three statements made for the Plan of Action (See Appendix F). Of
the three plan of action statements listed, the second plan of action statement and final
goals relate specifically to disaster preparedness and response (International Committee
of the Red Cross, Plan of Action, 1999). Statement 2 calls for humanitarian action in
times of armed conflict and other disasters. The final goals of this statement are as
follows:
2.1. Effective response in disaster situations through improved national and
international preparedness
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2.2. Strengthened mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination amongst states,
the Movement and other humanitarian actors
2.3. Provision for the rights and acute needs of the most vulnerable people as the
first priority for humanitarian action
2.4. Understanding of the respective roles of political, military and humanitarian
actors, and protection of humanitarian personnel (International Committee of the
Red Cross, Plan of Action, 1999).
A four-year timeframe was allotted and specific actions were set forth to attain the
goals listed by 2003. One example of this is Final Goal 2.2.5, which called for
cooperation among the states and the Movement in development of minimum standards
of humanitarian response “such as those elaborated in the Sphere Project” (International
Committee of the Red Cross, Plan of Action, 1999) (See Appendix F).
The Sphere Project (2004) was initiated in 1997. A group of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
started the project with a hope of improving disaster response within five vital areas:
water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health services. A
humanitarian charter was framed based on the international humanitarian and human
rights laws of the Geneva Convention and also the code of conduct of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent. This humanitarian charter identified the very minimum of disaster
response standards noting that each human has a right to receive assistance and live with
dignity.
What is Sphere?
The Sphere Project is three things: a book, a process and a commitment (Sphere
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Project, 2004). Sphere is based on the beliefs that human suffering, arising from disaster
or conflict, should be alleviated and that those affected by a disaster have a basic human
right to life, right to receive assistance and right to live with dignity.
The process of developing, compiling, assessing and utilizing minimum standards
of disaster response lead to the first publication of the Sphere handbook in 2000. The
technical section of the book covers key disaster response areas concerning health, water,
sanitation, shelter and nutrition. Each of these key areas is provided with a list of
minimum standards that should be attained during a response effort. The minimum
standards are qualitative in nature. For example, the first minimum standard in making
provision for health is to “prioritize health services” (Sphere Project, 2004, p. 254).
Key indicators are listed with each minimum standard in order to monitor and
measure whether the standards have been attained, as well as communicating the impact
of the response (Sphere Project, 2004). These key indicators are also known as “signals.”
An example of a key indicator that health services are being prioritized would the
identification, documentation and monitoring of the major causes of morbidity (illnesses)
and mortality (death) after the disaster.
Key indicators are grouped with guidance notes. These notes include important
points to consider when applying the standard and reviewing key indicators appropriately
fit for different situations (Sphere Project, 2004). Guidance notes raise questions to
consider and provide additional information for response situations when there is a lack
of information. A guidance note example for prioritizing basic public health services is
to consider the type of disaster and potential need for food, water, shelter, sanitation,
controlling the spread of disease and, if the disaster affects large amounts of people, to
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expand clinical health services to including trauma care (Sphere Project, 2004).
Of equal importance to the Sphere Project [if not greater importance to this
research] are eight core “process and people standards” (Sphere, 2004, p. 22) described
prior to the technical sections. These common standards, meaning the standards for all
aspects of disaster response relating to the process and the people involved, are a)
participation, b) initial assessment, c) response, d) targeting, e) monitoring, f) evaluation,
g) aid worker competencies and responsibilities, and h) supervision, management and the
support of personnel.
The Sphere Project was intended to be a process. The common standards listed
above, when utilized in the process of disaster response, will create the most efficient
disaster response (Sphere Project, 2004). It is imperative to assess the effects of the
disaster prior to planning a response. Targeting and prioritizing the needs of the people
and continuously monitoring the effects of the response allows the process to shift and
move as needed. Participation of people affected by the disaster in the assessment,
development, monitoring and evaluation ensures that the disaster response is appropriate
(Sphere Project, 2004). The first six common standards parallel the Participatory Theory
of Communications (See Appendix G).
Sphere calls for institutional commitment guided by legal responsibilities of
responding humanitarian organizations. The humanitarian organizations that receive the
Sphere training commit to abide by the humanitarian charter and to do all within their
control to respond appropriately to the given disaster situation (Sphere Project, 2004).
As a cumulative effort of several humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross
Movement, the Sphere Project gives guidance for appropriate disaster response. The
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Movement’s greatest contribution to Sphere was the framing of the humanitarian charter
and identifying “Minimum Standards to be attained in disaster assistance, in each of five
key sectors (water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health services)”
(Sphere Project, 2004, p. 2).
TRC involvement with Sphere
In 2003, at the 28th International Convention of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, a
follow-up report was presented on the Movement component’s implementation of the
Plan of Action since the 27th International Convention of 1999. The Thai Red Cross
(TRC) reported on both the implementation of cooperative efforts related to the Seville
Agreement and also on utilization of the minimum standards of disaster response. The
information for the follow-up report was acquired through questionnaires. The TRC
completed the questionnaire and it was recorded as received November 1, 2002, to the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Follow-up, 2003).
In the ICRC Follow-Up Report (2003), relating to cooperation within the
Movement and the Seville Agreement, the TRC “reported that their contribution to
International Federation and ICRC programmes took the form of keeping key persons or
delegates on call for FACTs (Field Assessment and Coordination Teams) and ERUs
[Emergency Response Units]” (p. 30). Specifically related to disaster response and the
Sphere Project, the TRC stated it was going to “study and modify the recommendations
of the Sphere Project and adapt them to local needs and particularities” (International
Committee of the Red Cross, Follow-up, 2003, p. 31).
The 28th Conference Report (International Committee of the Red Cross, Follow-up,
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2003) notes that National Society disaster relief delegates attended Sphere training
sessions. According to the IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Society, South East Asia Programme Update, 2002) the TRC received Sphere
training no later than May 2002. The IFRC organized a regional disaster management
(DM) program for the South East Asia in November 2001. This program included the
development of the Regional Disaster Management Committee (RDMC) involving both
Regional IFRC delegates and National Society managers. National DM delegates
networked and visited with other national DM delegates. In April 2002, the Thai Red
Cross DM delegates visited country delegates in both Cambodia and the Philippines
(International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, South East Asia
Programme Update, 2002). In May, the first Federation South East Asia and East Asia
regional Sphere training took place with national DM delegates. Although the specifics
of this particular training session cannot be determined, at least one representative from
the DM sector of the TRC received training on minimum standard for disaster response.
More generally, although the specifics of the Sphere training offered to the TRC
DM representative(s) cannot be determined, it appears that from as early as 1997 and in
conjunction with the IFRC, the TRC has been accountable for disaster response standards
consistent with those set forth by the Sphere Project (2004). Both of the IFRC disaster
preparedness and emergency response policies contain elements of the Sphere common
standards of a) participation, b) initial assessment, c) response, d) targeting, e)
monitoring, f) evaluation, and g) aid worker competencies and responsibilities
(International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Disaster Preparedness
Policy, 1999; International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Emergency
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Response Policy, 1997) (See Appendix H). The last paragraph of each of these IFRC
policies state that “National Societies and the International Federation are responsible to
ensure that all disaster preparedness activities [emergency response operations] and
programmes are carried out in compliance with this policy;” and that all participating
staff and volunteers are “aware of the rationale and content of the policy” (disaster
preparedness ¶ 14; emergency response ¶ 19).
The TRC website contains a page on disaster relief services (Thai Red Cross,
Disaster Relief Services, 2005). On the site, the TRC mentions that its disaster
preparedness and disaster response services are offered during all three phases of a
disaster (i.e., before, during and after) (See Appendix I). “In response to a disaster, relief
items such as food, clothing and other basic necessities are provided and mobile medical
teams fully equipped with first-aid kits, medicine and medical supplies are put into
operation” (Thai Red Cross, Disaster Relief Services, 2005, ¶ 1). Although this website
does not mention the common standards related to the Sphere Project (2004), the disaster
response activities listed allude to attainment of minimum standards in each key sector
relating to water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health services
(Sphere Project, 2004).
It is apparent that the TRC DM delegate(s) were taught about the Sphere Project
and, according to the IFRC South East Asia Programme Update (2002), there was a
future plan to have at least 10 Sphere Trainers from the South East Asia Movement
certified at a 2003 Training-of-Trainers (ToT) Sphere session.
Although the Sphere Handbook has been updated since its first printing in 2000, the
information gathered from the IFRC policies and South East Asia Programme reports
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verify the fact that the principles upon which the Sphere Project is based have remained
the same. It appears plausible that the disaster response delegate(s) of the TRC were
trained then on the “common standards” of disaster response during their 2002 Sphere
training sessions. It is important to understand the training background so we can
establish a standard against which we will measure the TRC’s response to the tsunami.
Communication Theories
There is no question that communication plays a pivotal role in disaster response.
Both the Seville Agreement and the Sphere Project identify “communications” as an
integral part in effective coordination and efficient humanitarian response. This section
will lay a foundation for the need to develop disaster communication theory to improve
communication with vulnerable groups or people. Disaster communication can be built
on the shoulders of related theories. Therefore, principles and practices of development
communications, which also focuses on communication with vulnerable groups, will be
summarized. The related theories of diffusion and participation will also be discussed.
Health communications will then be introduced to examine the principles and practices of
using diffusion and participatory theories within the arena of development
communications, to achieve desired health outcomes for individuals and communities.
Vulnerable Populations
Before these theories can be clearly explained, it is important to understand the
groups of people they address. The IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross and
Red Crescent Society, Who We Are, 2005) states, “Vulnerable people are those who are
at greatest risk from situations that threaten their survival, or their capacity to live with an
acceptable level of social and economic security and human dignity” (¶ 3). The World
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Bank (1996) groups the poor and others disadvantaged “in terms of wealth, education,
ethnicity or gender” (Chapter 1, p. 6) into a vulnerable class of society. Disasters create a
vulnerable population of people. Vulnerable people are found throughout the world and
in all walks of life. Whether a person is displaced from political warfare, is a child or
aged adult, is one suffering from poverty or other socio-economic crisis, or is victim of a
health emergency, his or her level of vulnerability can quickly change during and after a
natural disaster.
Who the world might consider a non-vulnerable individual may become
vulnerable, even for a short time, during a disaster. An example of this, from the 2004
tsunami in Thailand would be the healthy, wealthy, middle-aged tourist. Likewise, an
already vulnerable individual, such as an economically unstable displaced Burmese
immigrant living and working along the Andaman Coast of Thailand, is subjected to
increased vulnerability when a victim of a disaster.
Disaster Communications
There has been little effort focused specifically on a theory of disaster
communications. One document referencing “disaster communications” conferences at
the United Nations, held in the 1990s, looked specifically at using telecommunications
technology during disasters (Harbi, 2001). The result of these conferences was the
creation of the Tampere Convention (International Telecommunications Union, 1998), an
agreement of International Telecommunications Union members to use their specialized
telecommunications skills and information technologies to mitigate the effects of a
disaster (Harbi, 2001).
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Since the 2004 South East Asia Tsunami there have been a few groups calling for
significant disaster communication research focusing specifically on vulnerable groups
and the immediately affected disaster victims. Sondorp and Bornemisza (2005) called for
more research in the disaster communication field focusing on finding better ways to
“communicate the right information at the right time to the right audience….[and to]
improve interventions in fragile states…[and among] vulnerable populations” (¶ 7).
Public relations professionals (Morley, 2005) also voiced their desire to improve disaster
communications by thinking and acting locally and addressing the needs of the victims
immediately affected by the disaster.
Although there is a recognized need for increased understanding about disaster
communications, there is clearly a need to further develop disaster communications
theory. At the same time, there has been a good deal of research focusing on
communicating with vulnerable groups in developing nations. This research has
identified principles of development communications that can be used as a guide to
studying disaster communications because both fields address similar audiences. The
common denominator of both development communication and disaster communication
is the audience of vulnerable people.
Development Communication
Development communication is a subset of mass communications theory and has
several definitions, ideologies and approaches. Wilkins (2000) defined development
communication as, “the strategic application of communication technologies and
processes to promote social change” (p. 197). Bessette (1996) noted that the general
reference of development communication is “the planned use of strategies and processes
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of communication aimed at achieving development” (¶ 5). Waisbord (2001) provided
this general definition:
Development communication refers to the application of communication
strategies and principles in the developing world. It is derived from theories of
development and social change that identified the main problems of the post-war
world in terms of lack of development or progress equivalent to Western
countries. (p. 1)
However, Melkote and Steeves (2001) definition provided a more concise yet holistic
profile of development communication:
Development is usually understood to mean the process by which societal
conditions are improved….Empowerment…is defined as the process by which
individuals, organizations, and communities gain control and mastery over social
and economic conditions, over democratic participation within their communities,
and over their stories….Our understanding of development communication
emerged from our understanding of development as empowerment and
communication as shared meaning. It involves issues at all levels of
consideration: the grassroots, large community, regional, national and global
levels. (p. 44)
While defining “development communication” it becomes necessary to clarify the
meaning of these terms: underdeveloped and developing countries, developing world, and
the Third World. Each of these terms denote countries, nations or communities that are
struggling with social and/or political issues relating to poverty, unemployment,
illiteracy, hunger, famine, disease and sanitation concerns, and refugee displacement
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(Melkote & Steeves, 2001; Waisbord, 2001). Melkote and Steeves (2001) used the terms
underdeveloped and Third World synonymously, and for simplicity throughout this
thesis, all four terms will be use interchangeably.
Development communications got its start in the 1950s as international aid
programs entered struggling countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa. The program
administrators were armed with communication theory and methods as tools that were
believed could elevate these countries out of poverty, illiteracy, health crises, and
political and social instability (Waisbord, 2001). Theories of development
communication were often based on the idea that the social problems were a result of
either a lack of information or some power inequality in society, or both (Waisbord,
2001). Two major models of development communication are diffusion of innovations
and participatory communication.
Diffusion of Innovations Theory
The diffusion model of development communication evolved from Everett
Rogers’s work as a way to combat lack of information for social and behavioral change
(Morris, 2003; Waisbord, 2001). Rogers’s diffusion of innovations (1962) model
identified five steps on the path to adoption of innovations: awareness, knowledge and
interest, decision, trial, and adoption or rejection. The process of diffusion has been seen
as a vertical top-down or “trickle down” (Waisbord 2001, p. 5) model. According to
Baran and Davis (2000), diffusion theory is a “source-dominated theory that sees the
communication process from the point of view of an elite that has decided to diffuse an
innovation” (p. 162). McQuail (2000) used the terms “hierarchy of status and expertise”
and “linearity of effect” (p. 450) to describe the path of diffusion.
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Rogers (1962) discovered that these new innovations, technologies or concepts
must pass through a series of stages before being widely adopted by a targeted
population. People become aware of new innovations through media channels. The
innovation will be adopted first by a small group of risk takers known as early adopters.
As others slowly start to adopt the innovation, opinion leaders, who have proven the
innovation beneficial, emerge and encourage friends to try it for themselves. Because
opinion leaders are respected and trusted in their communities, more people try the
innovation and adoption rates quickly increase. The last group identified in the adoption
process is a small cohort known as late adopters or laggards.
Whether an early adopter or a laggard, the desired outcome for adopting the new
technical device, concept or useful information remains the same for all groups. Morris
(2003) notes the standard formula for the diffusion model is knowledge/attitude/practice
or KAP. The premise of diffusion theory is that information, transmitted through a mass
media source to the intended audience, will lead to knowledge; this knowledge will
change attitude and result in a change in behavior and/or practice. The role the media
play in diffusion is concentrated only on the first (awareness, knowledge, information)
stage.
Participatory Communication
By the 1970s, Rogers’s theory of diffusion was seen as marginal in its
effectiveness when used as the sole instrument of change. Rogers (1976) himself noted
that interpersonal communication and personal participation in the decision making
process were more effective in bringing about social and behavioral changes than pure
persuasion.
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Participatory communication emerged as a reaction the vertical model of diffusion
noting that development communication could not exist on information transmission
alone (Morris, 2003). According to Morris (2003), the participatory model stems from a
horizontal process of information sharing that creates a dialogue between interested
parties and leads to individual and community empowerment.
The essence of the participatory approach lies in working with citizens to
determine their needs and design and implement programs to address these needs,
rather than imposing an intervention on a community… .Genuine participatory
projects are seen to be those in which there is a grassroots control over key
program decisions. (Morris, 2003, p. 226)
The Brazilian born educator, Paulo Freire is credited for influencing and shaping
participatory communication as a way for individuals to have greater control over
decisions that affect them (Morris, 2003; Waisbord, 2001). Freire’s work, titled The
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), provided the world with an understanding of the
effective power of dialogue and information exchange in the process of creating social
equity, democratic practices and progression toward development. These interactive and
horizontal communication practices of information exchange were seen as important keys
to empowering oppressed or disadvantaged people.
Individual participation in the creation and sharing of information is vital to the
communication processes of development because of the feelings of ownership and
accomplishment enjoyed by indigenous participants (Rogers, 1976; Waisbord, 2001).
Wilkins (2000) noted that development communication for social change requires a
serious look at the power issues of information and technology control, especially when
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developed nations create messages for underdeveloped communities without appropriate
participation of the targeted group. There have been instances when powerful
industrialized nations have constructed and disseminated messages to the Third World
without an understanding of the audience’s intrinsic cultures, customs, religion, political
and social values and gender issues. These oversights resulted in ineffective
communication (Melkote & Steeves, 2001).
Over time, aid organization field workers saw the stark realities of Third World
nations and implemented appropriate communication at the grassroots levels of society,
empowering individuals and communities to participate in the construction and
dissemination of messages concerning issues of development. The value of audience
participation and self-determination in the communication process was realized as these
grassroots methods started to produce the desired social changes (Melkote & Steeves,
2001; Rogers, 1983; Wilkins, 2000).
Development communication has evolved over the years. Diffusion theory and
participatory models have been utilized to construct social marketing and behavioral
change campaigns throughout the developed and developing world. Some funding
agencies of international development communications projects will only fund projects
that use one or the other of these communication models. This is because evaluation
measures of intervention effectiveness are weighted upon the model used and affects the
length of time for the project and the cost of the project. Generally, diffusion model
projects for social change are less time consuming and require a more simplistic method
of evaluation than participatory projects.
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However, Morris (2003) noted that the relationship between diffusion and
participatory development communication projects is inseparable in today’s world
because projects either utilize techniques from both models of communication or produce
outcomes consistent with a mixture of both models. The reason for this mixture is that
the original diffusion model that focused mainly on the transfer of information has
evolved in a participatory direction. This has come about as the importance of dialogue
and participant self-determination has been realized (Melkote & Steeves, 2001; Morris,
2003; Rogers, 1976; Rogers, 1983; Waisbord, 2001). Additionally, the participatory
models of development communication all contain some aspect of information transfer,
thus incorporating, at the very least, the “awareness” aspect, which is the first step of
adoption in the original diffusion model (Melkote & Steeves, 2001; Morris, 2003;
Rogers, 1976; Rogers, 1983; Waisbord 2001). Waisbord (2001) notes, “The current aim
of development communications is to remove constraints for a more equal and
participatory society” (p. 2). In the end, diffusion and participatory communication have
come together with diffusion theory exploring information transfer and participatory
communication focusing on individual and group exchange and adaptation of
information.
Health communications
A review of development communication literature shows how government and
NGO agencies have addressed health concerns in the developing world. Agency-funded
health interventions have spread around the globe to many Third World and developing
nations through health campaigns and social marketing efforts. These campaigns have
addressed safety issues, alcohol and tobacco consumption, infant’s and women’s health,
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HIV/AIDS, family planning, and general health promotion. Because health is a key
indicator differentiating between First World and Third World development status
(Central Intelligence Agency, n.d.; World Bank, 1996; World Bank, 2006), health
communications plays a significant role in development communication.
Development communications is defined as a strategy for improvement in societal
conditions through empowerment and information exchange (Melkote & Steeves, 2001).
In relation, health communications is loosely defined as the improvement of health by
encouraging behavior modification and/or social change (Schiavo, 2005). Development
communication principles have been used to address health issues through the creation
and implementation of social marketing campaigns, health education, health promotion
programs, and educational entertainment.
Schiavo (2005) noted that the terms health communication, social marketing and
health education have been used synonymously, however, there are significant
differences between them that affect program planning and evaluation. According to
Schiavo (2005), the most important difference is that health communication does not rely
upon a single theoretical framework in the construction and dissemination of health
messages to a targeted audience. She stated:
Health communication recognizes the complexity of attaining behaviour and
social change and uses a multi-faceted approach that is grounded in the
application of several theoretical frameworks and disciplines, including but not
being limited to health education, social marketing, behavioural and social change
theories…With the audience always at the core of each intervention, it uses a
case-by case approach in selecting those models, theories and strategies. (Schiavo,

Disaster Communication Networks 35
2005, ¶ 5)
International health campaigns, focused on improving personal, community and
societal health, have incorporated and utilized both the diffusion and participatory
principles of development communication. Evaluation of such health communication
campaigns have had mixed reviews of effectiveness in attaining the desired results.
Morris (2003) lists several media-centered campaigns producing limited results (Hornik,
1988, pp.140-144; McDivitt & McDowell, 1991; Ogundimu, 1994; Valente & Saba,
1998; Yoder, Zheng, & Zhou, 1991) and also listed projects with a social marketing
foundation that have been broadly productive in attaining the desired outcome (McDivitt,
Zimicki, & Hornik, 1997; Jato et al., 1999; Kincaid, 2000; Piotrow et al., 1990). The
success or failure of these projects is affected by many variables and is not always a
direct result of the theory or method used to guide the project.
Dalrymple (2004) argued there may be ethical dilemmas concerning culture and
tradition that affect the outcomes of health communications campaigns. Health
communications is affected by the same variables of culture, religion, gender issues and
societal values that affect the success of development communication interventions.
Cultural and societal values of the industrialized world may be very different from the
cultural and societal values intrinsic to the underdeveloped communities to whom the
message is intended. These variables can greatly affect the success and/or outcomes of
health campaigns if not addressed appropriately.
Educational background can also play into the success or failure of health
communications campaigns (Valente, Kim, Lettenmaier, Glass, & Dibba, 1994; Kane,
Gueye, Speizer, Pacque-Margolis, & Baron, 1998). Two similar family-planning
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campaigns were conducted in Western Africa. The nations of The Gambia and Mali
were targeted with campaigns that combined both social marketing and education
entertainment techniques. The results between the countries were greatly varied. Within
The Gambia, uneducated individuals who listened to the radio drama showed an increase
in knowledge, attitude and practice from the campaign (Valente et al, 1994). However,
Kane et al (1998) found the opposite to be true among uneducated individuals within
Mali and noted that the uneducated were not affected by the media campaign, but
educated individuals were. These results suggest there were additional cultural variables
affecting the success of the family-planning campaign within Mali. The results
emphasize the point that what works for one group or culture may not work for another
and also illustrates the need to create projects on individual group variables using
whatever appropriate method or combination of methods to achieve the desired outcome.
Research by Morris (2003) provided a look into the outcomes of both diffusionbased and participatory-based health programs in underdeveloped nations. The purpose
of her study was not to determine the cause and effects of interventions, but rather to
assess whether the outcomes aligned with program goals. Social marketing campaigns
are based on the principle of persuasion and generally fall in the diffusion sphere (Morris,
2003). The goal of diffusion is to create a change in behavior or practice; for example,
through media channels a health product (such as a condom) would be marketed. The
desired goal of the social marketing campaign would be condom use. The outcome
indicator (assuming the purchased product is used) could be monitored by tracking
condom sales.
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Participatory projects have two goals: first to achieve a desired outcome, and
second to encourage participation in the decision-making process. Therefore,
participatory projects are monitored for “outcome indicators” and also “process
indicators” (Morris 2003, p. 8). Health education and promotion projects have generally
been grouped in the participatory sphere. For example, a health promotion project about
safe sex might utilize statistical data of condom sales as an outcome indicator. Process
indicators are more qualitative and subjective but may be identified as an increase in the
community dialogue concerning safe sex.
Morris (2003) studied the outcomes of 44 international health campaigns or
communication interventions for evidence of outcomes consistent with either the
diffusion model (i.e., change in knowledge, attitudes and behavior) or outcomes
identifiable to the participatory model (i.e. individual, social and community
empowerment) and noted whether the outcomes were consistent with the desired goal of
the original project. Each of the 44 development communication projects was focused on
an aspect of health and took place in developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin
America. The diffusion and participatory studies chosen for review were based on
specific criteria. “Each was an empirical study of one or more communication
interventions that included information on the objectives and nature of intervention, the
method of evaluation, and the outcome” (Morris, 2003, p. 3). Outcomes of these
communication interventions were based only on the information provided in the
individual articles and only according to the research criteria utilized in the original
articles. By utilizing this information, Morris was able to determine whether outcomes of
these studies were diffusion based (i.e. change in knowledge, attitude, behavior),
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participatory based (i.e. individual, social and community empowerment) or a mixture of
both.
Morris (2003) compared study outcomes with their original study objectives and
found that the gap separating diffusion and participatory communication initiatives is
slowly closing. Whether or not the planners of these communicative health initiatives
knowingly borrow elements from each model, the results verified that some diffusion
projects had participatory outcomes and that participatory programs also had a mixture of
diffusion and participatory outcomes (Morris, 2003). From this evidence, Morris called
for additional research for new development communication models and theories that
will improve the desired outcomes of such development programs. She noted that
looking into other disciplines of scholarship could add significantly to the field of
development communication (Morris, 2003).
It is interesting to note that Morris comes from the discipline of communications
while Schivio comes from the discipline of health and medicine. The difference between
the two disciplines is evident by the scope of their research. The discipline of
communications addresses a small, but significant, part of a whole social system. The
discipline of medicine addresses the holistic health and wellbeing of individuals and
social systems. Holistic medicine addresses every part of the person including but not
limited to physical, social, spiritual, emotional, cultural and mental parts. Public health
looks at entire social systems that affect individual and community health and wellbeing.
Schivio’s (2005) description of health communication drew from multiple
theoretical frameworks, methods, principles and disciplines in the construction and
dissemination of health messages for a targeted audience was a holistic view of how to
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address multiple parts comprising an entire health system of a targeted audience.
Therefore, Morris’s plea to develop better development communication models will be
answered within the scholastic discipline of medicine. Because health communications
utilizes a multifaceted and multi-disciplinarian approach to address social and health
issues, it is an excellent place to converge theoretical and academic efforts to improve
development communications. Therefore, the study of health communications provides
an excellent foundation for the origination of disaster communications theory.
Disaster Communication
Disaster communication is a vital part of disaster planning. Communicating with
disaster victims about issues of health and recovery is vital to saving lives and mitigating
the effects of disasters. When a natural disaster occurs in developed and developing
nations, agencies respond with relief, rescue, and recovery efforts. According to
Campbell (2005), “rescue” is generally understood as a physical rescue from lifethreatening situations. The meaning of “recovery” after a disaster is contextually varied
to mean anything from recovery of dead bodies, to recovery of health, and even to
recovery of livelihood (Campbell, 2005). The Thai Red Cross disaster preparedness and
response plan notes both rescue and recovery as responses it provides before, during, and
after the disaster (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society,
Thai Red Cross profile, 2003; Thai Red Cross Society, Disaster Relief Services, 2005).
Natural and man-made disasters are multifaceted and have an effect on many
different aspects of life, livelihood, health and humanity. Groups of humanitarian
responders from all sectors of government and civil and social entities converge in
response to a disaster and assist in rescue, recovery and rebuilding efforts. Many
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different disciplines are represented within disaster response efforts and therefore should
be utilized to create policies and systems that most efficiently produce the greatest good
for the victims of such disasters.
In addition to development communication, principles and practices from the field
of health communications also provide guidance for how to assess the needs and involve
the impacted population in order to effectively address the issues associated with a
disaster. Understanding these theories provides a foundation for understanding the
response of the Thai Red Cross to the Southeast Asian tsunami. The participatory
approach is especially beneficial for developing disaster communication theory because it
empowers the victims to effectively deal with their situation.
According to the development communication model of participation, transfer of
information between aid organizations and disaster victims will generally improve the
desired effect of the health and relief campaign. Landesman (2001) noted, “Validation
that the intent of the message was understood is evident by safety responses of citizens,
use of shelters, and other appropriate actions” (p. 75).
The present study is aimed at investigating the disaster communication practices
of the Thai Red Cross Society. Following the December 26, 2004, Asian tsunami, the
TRC responded to the disaster affecting areas of Southern Thailand. The purpose of this
study is to determine the mode of message construction, message content, and
dissemination channels of health and relief information given, by the TRC, directly to the
immediately affected victims of the tsunami.
Researchers have noted the importance for both vertical dissemination (diffusion)
of information and also horizontal (participatory) communication (Schivo, 2005; Morris,
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2003; Rogers, 1983; Servaes, 1996) working simultaneously in development
communication efforts. Servaes (1996) called for the use of a “multiplicity paradigm” (p.
106) that will account for multiple political, cultural and situational elements in the
construction of development communication programs. Following a natural disaster,
appropriate use of both diffusion and participatory communication models will lead to
more efficient disaster communications which will mitigate suffering and provide relief
to disaster victims. This study seeks to understand how this took place after the tsunami
by examining the communication practices of the TRC through the lenses of disaster,
development, and health communications.
This research will contribute to improvement of disaster communication strategies
and add depth to developmental and health communications research by taking a
snapshot of the disaster communication network within the Red Cross Society of
Thailand. The ultimate goal is to provide information that can help the lives of future
disaster victims.
Research Questions
The main question guiding this research was as follows: what are the disaster
communication networks and disaster communications policies of the Thai Red Cross
Society? The answers from the following four sub-questions culminated to create an
analytical framework of the Thai Red Cross disaster communication network.
RQ1: What are the disaster communication policies of the Thai Red Cross?
RQ2: What communication networks, both mass communication and
interpersonal communication were utilized to disseminate messages from the
TRC to Tsunami Survivors?

Disaster Communication Networks 42
RQ3: How did the TRC acquire information about community needs in the Phang
Nga Province?
RQ3a: Who communicated with whom about community needs?
RQ4: According to the TRC, were the community’s needs met?
RQ4a: How does the TRC evaluate their effectiveness in disaster communication?
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Chapter 3 Methodology
Description of Method
This is an ethnographic case study that investigated the phenomenon of disaster
communications policies and practices within the organization of the TRC in response to
the December 2004 Asian tsunami. A case study utilizes as many data sources as
possible to answer questions of “how” and “why” (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). Semistructured interviews, phone and e-mail communications, internet searches and artifact
collection added to the depth of understanding. Unconventional for most mass
communications research (research which is guided by the methodology), this case study
research required use of multiple research methods and led to deepening questions
concerning disaster communications.
This case study was conducted using qualitative fact-finding methods.
Information, data and artifacts were gathered about the TRC’s disaster communication
processes via interviews, meetings, observations and interactions. A journal and field
notes were kept which included these observations, certain contextual meanings, thoughts
and impressions. Non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel (working in the area
immediately following the disaster) and Phang Nga Province villagers offered unsolicited
comments and information concerning the efforts of the TRC. This information was used
to contextualize meanings of research data, offer depth of understanding, and provide
clarification and/or validation to the situations following the phenomenal disaster.
Acquiring official information and policies directly from the TRC proved
challenging. During the course of collecting this information, there were several
interactions with TRC personnel who responded that they were not authorized to answer
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questions about the official disaster communication policy. Over time these individuals
provided non-verbal body language, such as nodding of the head up and down or back
and forth to the researcher’s verbal assumptions for the delay in acquiring official disaster
communication policy. Their non-verbal responses and body language added greater
validity to certain findings.
Web based research was utilized to answer the deeper and additional questions
that evolved concerning disaster communication policies and also to acquire organization
communications documents of several agencies, including the TRC, involved in the
recovery and reconstruction efforts following the Tsunami. Multiple sources of evidence
were used to compare and triangulate data for reliability and consistency (Wimmer &
Dominick, 2003; Yin, 2003).
Strengths of Methodology
The major strength of case study research is that it answers “what” “why” and
“how” questions within the context of real life situations, and provides explanations for
complex contemporary events related to “individual life cycles, organizational and
managerial processes, neighborhood change, international relations, and the maturation of
industries” (Yin, 2003, p. 2). Additionally, case studies deal with a plethora of variables
and require the collection of multiple sources of evidence for a complete and allencompassing (holistic) study. According to Yin (2003), “The most important advantage
presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines
of inquiry, a process of triangulation;” this triangulation of multiple sources of evidence
makes case study findings more “convincing and accurate” (p. 98).
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Because multiple variables are interacting during a specific situation, case study
research provides an opportunity for researchers to evaluate strengths and weaknesses of
the specific application of theories, principles, and practices. Because this is a case study
specific to the Thai Red Cross’s disaster response, the strength of this study lies in
achieving a certain depth of knowledge concerning the TRC and its disaster
communications response, with the focus being on those immediately affected by the
tsunami.
Weaknesses of Methodology
There are multiple weaknesses thought to affect case study research. These
weaknesses relate to an inability to make scientific generalizations from the research
findings because of a possible lack of rigor, extensive time requirements to finish the
research, and research biases that many times influences the findings (Yin, 2003).
Wimmer and Dominick (2003) also noted that it is often not possible to replicate case
studies because situational variables change or transform over time.
The down side to this specific case study is that the research findings cannot be
generalized to other humanitarian organizations. Therefore, the findings of this study are
specific only to the TRC. However, anecdotal evidence from this research may guide
additional case study research of similar disaster communication phenomena.
Only a minimal part of this study could be replicated with any bit of confidence
(Wimmer & Dominick, 2003; Yin, 2003). As time passes, reports of the actual
communications efforts change as memories fade and individual agendas change. It
would be impossible to replicate this study in its entirety because so many of the
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determining variables have changed or transformed over time. Therefore, another
weakness of this study is the lack of replication.
Researcher bias. Another weakness worth mentioning is that I, as the researcher,
have my own biases related to my frame of reference from which I have collected and
analyze the data. I have been mindful of my biases and tried to acquire additional facts
and information, from a variety of sources, to add depth to the analysis. This study was
specifically focused in an attempt to hedge my own biases by looking at several sides of
the disaster communications networks of the TRC. However meticulous, one cannot
deny the facts of personal biases and personal perceptions of what is real and what is
truth. Personal bias adds the additional factor of “perspective” which can change the
findings from one researcher to another.
To understand these possible biases, some information about myself is included
so that the readers can more accurately assess the study. First, I am a medical
professional. I am a seasoned nurse with over 15 years experience. The first course of
action to help a patient is to do an assessment (find out what is hurt), diagnose the
problem, and then, if I have the resources, provide a treatment. If I am lacking the skill
or resources, then I ask for assistance or at least refer them to one who has the ability and
resources to help.
I am a humanitarian. I have been all over the world doing humanitarian service
and working in the field of development. This humanitarian work has taken me from
Russia and Asia to Central and Southern Africa. When I help those in need, located in a
developing country, I use the same formula of treatment as in the hospital: assess the
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needs, diagnose the problem, assess the resources, and then allocate resources to needs.
Efficient communication is the focal point of effectiveness in the process of treatment.
Definition of Terms
Disaster communication is defined for the purpose of this thesis as the sharing and
exchange of information with the victims immediately affected by the disaster. The
tsunami left behind many victims. Victims immediately affected by the disaster were
those whose health, wellbeing, livelihoods, and/or place of residence were affected by the
Asian tsunami in Phang Nga Province, Thailand.
Collection of Data
To gain an understanding of how, why and what kind of disaster communication
took place in Thailand after the tsunami, the researcher lived within the culture and
customs of the Thai people and around the TRC for a total of more than four months.
This time was accumulated from two separate trips. The first visit was from May to
August 2005. The researcher was located in the Khao Lak area of Phang Nga Province
for the entire 10-week period. According to the United Nations, the tsunami hit the
Phang Nga Province the hardest and created the most damage along the Andaman Coast
(Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Thailand Ministry of Interior,
2005; Merlin-Scholtes, 2005). The second trip lasted from January to March 2006 for a
total of seven weeks. The researcher stayed in both Phang Nga and Bangkok, with
Bangkok serving as the research base. The National Headquarters of the TRC is located
in Bangkok and is the home of the Disaster Preparedness and Response Relief Operations
Center.
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These trips were necessary because ethnographic studies revolve around the
researcher being immersed in the culture and customs of the group or organization being
studied, thereby providing the researcher with a “native perspective” (Wimmer &
Dominick, 2005). While conducting this study the researcher used her health background
and was significantly involved in humanitarian efforts throughout the tsunami-affected
areas of Thailand. This provided the researcher with a unique opportunity for participant
observation. Daily interaction with tsunami victims, disaster responders, Red Cross and
other non-governmental humanitarian organization (NGHO) volunteers added
considerable depth and breadth to the researcher’s understanding. Journal entries,
photographs, and field notes containing observations, impressions and contextual
information were collected and used in order to gain the meaning sought by this study.
Primary sources of data originated from acquisition of the ICRC Communication
Guide (2003), semi-structured interviews, meetings, e-mail and phone contact,
documentation of mitigation reduction training, official government reports and the
acquisition of a hard copy of the disaster response website. Interviews were conducted
with TRC volunteers and administration officials from both the Provincial and National
levels. These interviews fit the definition of semi-structured interviews because
individuals were all asked the same basic questions, but responses guided the order and
prompted additional questions to glean additional information (Wimmer & Dominick,
2003). These guiding questions are located in Appendix J.
Red Cross Policy
The initial purpose of this research was motivated by “what” and “how”
questions. What was the TRC’s disaster communications policy? How was it
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implemented? How did the TRC communicate with the disaster victims when the
phenomenal destruction annihilated technological infrastructure and there were masses of
victims needing help immediately following the December 26, 2004, Asian tsunami.
Prior to leaving for Thailand, 2005, a copy of the ICRC Communication Guide
(2003) was examined. This guide is a “training and operational resource for National
Red Cross and Red Crescent Society information officers worldwide, as well as delegates
working alongside them” (International Committee of the Red Cross, Communication
Guide, 2003).
No other resource guides were located concerning the mass communication
practices and policies of the Red Cross, and particularly the Thai Red Cross, therefore
this sanctioned Communication Guide was the only document guiding a priori knowledge
of the disaster communications practices of the TRC.
Interviews
Three informal interviews were conducted with TRC officials in the field. Prior
to each interview, the interviewees were informed about the identify of the researcher, the
intended purpose of the interview and how the information they provided would be used.
After informing the participants about the research, they were asked if they consented to
the interview. Each participant verbally consented. A signed consent was deferred on
account that this research is qualitative and fact-finding in nature and the individuals
interviewed were not answering surveys, questionnaires, or participating in formal
interviews.
Language barriers were bridged via use of competent translators who are fluent in
both Thai and English. These translators were chosen based on their English and Thai
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translation capabilities, and their knowledge of Thai culture. Thai nationals were used as
translators during the semi-structured interviews. Thai nationals and expatriates who
have extensive experience with the Thai people served as translators during the rest of the
research conducted in Thailand. These individuals possessed the ability to “read” the
people and decipher the nuances of their communication through verbal and physical
cues. Information was deemed trustworthy upon recommendation of the translator. The
information was considered valid and credible when it was validated by two other
sources. The World Bank (1996) follows the rule of thumb that “at least three sources
must be consulted or techniques must be used to investigate the same topic” (p. 191).
Two of the three semi-structured interviews conducted from May through August,
2005, were audio recorded and then transcribed. Equipment malfunction prevented the
audio recording of the third interview of Mrs. Tasana Meteeviboonwut, Phang Nga
Province President. Tasana gave verbal consent for this interview and hand-written notes
were taken of the discussion and interview. (Thai people use their given names, rather
than their long family surnames, while communicating with others. Sometimes an
individual may be addressed only by their official title such a “President” or “Colonel.”
This same convention of naming will be used throughout the thesis. The surnames will
only be included occasionally and when deemed appropriate for clarification.)
The first interview took place on Friday, May 27, 2005 (5 months and 1 day after
the tsunami) at the Frontline Disaster Operations Center located in Phang Nga Province,
Khao Lak Coast, in Bang Niang Sub-District. Mr. Songphop Samee (nickname Choo),
Frontline field officer for the TRC was interviewed. This interview lasted approximately
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two hours. Choo is an Indian-Thai citizen (Indian father and Thai mother) who was born
in Thailand and educated in India. He speaks and reads both Thai and English fluently.
Choo arranged for an interview with Colonel Chinnarat Rattanajikasem,
commander over Frontline, within two weeks after the first research interview. However,
this interview was continuously postponed until a chance meeting, in the field, Saturday,
July 9, 2005 (7 months 13 days since the tsunami), at an opening ceremony of a public
children’s library in the Baan Thung Khamin village, Khuk Khek Sub-District. Colonel
Chinnarat was in the area surveying community projects. Choo introduced us and
informed the Colonel of my desire for an interview with him. Despite the Colonel’s tight
schedule, he agreed to be interviewed for a few moments. The interview lasted for one
hour twenty minutes. Choo served as interpreter.
The third interview was conducted on Monday, August 1, 2005 (8 months 6 days
since the tsunami), with Tasana Meteeviboonwut, TRC President of the Phang Nga
Province. The interview was held at the Governor’s Mansion in the Province’s capital
city, Phang Nga. Mrs. Tasana is the Governor’s wife, and the Provincial Red Cross
Headquarters are located at the Governor’s residence. Tasana understands and speaks
English fairly well. However, Ms. Raweewan Yingwansiri, the Chapter Secretary,
attended the meeting and served as interpreter. Raweewa, is the head doctor of
Veterinary Medicine at the Provincial Head Offices of Agriculture and Livestock, located
in Phang Nga, and is fluent in English. This interview lasted about one hour.
Because of some language barriers and possibly some cultural barriers, additional
questions were asked which were relevant to this research and provided clarification,
explanation, and background to the processes of the Thai Red Cross. Understanding the
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context of the situation was imperative for the interviewer/researcher. When a subject of
interest arose, the conversation went on a tangent from specific mass communications
and disaster communications questions and organizational setup of the TRC. These
tangential conversations added depth of understanding for the researcher in relation to the
circumstances surrounding the effect of the disaster on people, places, livelihoods, and
the humanitarian response efforts as a whole.
The first two interviews (concerning the efforts of Frontline) were recorded using
a digital recorder and a video camera respectively. These interviews were later
transcribed. Because of a malfunction of the recording equipment, notes were taken
during the interview with Tasana (Provincial President of the TRC). Personal
impressions, restatements of discussion, and interviewee’s implied meanings were
written within the margin or bracketed within the text of the transcription. These nuances
became more clear to the researcher after the first 10 weeks in Thailand trying to
understand the people and their culture.
Secondary or supportive sources of data were the field notes and journals that
listed observations, impressions and possible meanings of experiences. Artifacts that
were collected from the head office in Bangkok included a few TRC publication booklets
and a hard copy of the TRC website listing one paragraph as its Disaster Preparedness
and Response Plan. This site was first removed and then updated on the TRC website
during September 2005.
Deeper Questions
From these initial interviews and observations concrete evidence evolved that the
Phang Nga TRC did not use any official disaster communication models. Therefore a
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search ensued to determine if the TRC has disaster communications policies established
at the highest levels of the National Society. These searches proved enlightening in many
ways and led to additional questions and research. Furthermore, the research led to a
baffling venture into unraveling the question of effective disaster communications, in
general, as it relates to natural disasters, the victims, and the discipline of mass
communications. Most of this research was performed using internet resources. Informal
friendly discussions with PR professionals also added understanding.
After the first return from Thailand, the incredulous reality that there was no
written disaster communication policy/plan authored or utilized by the Thai Red Cross
prior to and immediately after the Asian tsunami was compelling enough to extend the
research to answer the question of “why.”
With the professional background and international development experience of
the researcher guiding this case study, the continued questioning of why disaster
communications practices and policies within the Red Cross neglect those most
vulnerable at the time of a disaster became overwhelming. The Red Cross disaster
communication practices and policies were filled with public relations rhetoric targeting
general masses not the immediate victims. Grass roots needs assessments, utilizing
participatory communication (inclusive of the victims) was thought to be a more
appropriate course to more efficiently guide the disaster response as a coordinated effort
for all involved. This is where the initial research was carried and where the method of
research was forged. Frustration grew as almost all of the academic searches relative to
the topic of disaster communication, crisis communication, and emergency
communication within the discipline of "mass communications" proved to be tilted as far
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into the PR corner as the Red Cross Communication Guide. It was a great struggle
because it seemed just absurd that disaster communications would not seek to acquire
information from and deliver reliable information to the "patients" (in the nursing
world) or the "victims" (in the disaster world) who are immediately affected by the
disaster. It seemed a great disparity of priorities.
The world of medicine and healthcare is filled with commonsense treatments.
The results of theses academic searches were not common sense in nature and only added
fuel to the issues of communication breakdown during a disaster. Believing there must
be another answer, a search of "disaster communication(s)" within the discipline of
medicine was entered. Articles on the importance of assessing the situation and having a
good transfer of information between the “one in need” and the “one trying to meet
those needs” with resources emerged (Campbell, 2005; Disaster Management, 2004;
Noji, 2005b).
In an effort to search deeper for thick description of information relating to the
TRC disaster communication policy and practices, creativity became a necessary tool.
Some evaluation reports from the United Nations about the relief efforts, with reference
to the TRC, were eventually found. Also, documentation of “Sphere Project” training for
the TRC was uncovered. The Sphere Project relates to minimum standards required for
disaster response and disaster reduction. A section of this training discusses appropriate
communications with the victims to assess needs and coordinate relief efforts according
those needs (Sphere Project, 2004). The Red Cross in Thailand received this training
in March of 2002. These documents provided a small glimpse of hope that there was,
after all, a disaster communications plan at the Administration Level of the TRC.
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From the United States, more than a dozen phone calls were placed to the TRC
Headquarters, in Bangkok, during the last four months of 2005. Several e-mails were sent
to the TRC website Webmaster asking for the 2004 Disaster Response page. This page
was utilized by the TRC from early Spring 2004 until the site was updated in September
2005. The site was the only TRC-specific document found that referred to a disaster plan
and communications. Results of the phone call and e-mail petitions were discouraging.
All efforts to acquire information, documentation or proof of a disaster communication
plan from the Administration level of the TRC via these efforts were futile from the
United States.
A second trip to Thailand became inevitable. The TRC had previously been very
helpful and accommodating with a physical presence before them. The research was not
progressing and it was evident that answers would only come if another physical
presence was made to the TRC administrative offices. During the January-March 2006
trip to Bangkok, there were several visits to the national headquarters, a plethora of emails and phone calls (while in-country) to both the Relief and Community Health
Bureau (which encompasses a Disaster Response Center) and the International Relations
Center finally proved productive.
Two informal meetings were held at the National Red Cross Headquarters. The
first meeting, on February 1, 2006, was with Deputy Director Wantanee Kongsomboon
of the Relief and Community Health Bureau, with Ms. Vichitra Watcharawaratorn, Head
Secretary of International Relations, Administration Bureau, in attendance. During this
meeting the same questions were posed to Deputy Director Wantanee as asked in the
semi-structured interviews. She reported she was not authorized to answer these
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questions and therefore referred me to a Dr. Kamchorn Tafiyakavee, Head Doctor of the
TRC, and Mr. Sawanit Konsiri, Assistant Secretary General for International (External)
Relations, Administration Bureau. Both men had authority to respond to the questions
concerning TRC official policy.
Neither source responded to inquiries. A lack of progress initiated a second
meeting at headquarters. On March 6, 2006, a meeting was had with Ms. Vicithra and
she was presented with a letter containing an abridged version of the semi-structured
interview questions to give to Mr. Sawanit. The essence of the letter was straightforward in three questions. First, did the TRC have a disaster communication plan prior
to the tsunami? If yes, what was it and how was it utilized? Second, how did the TRC
know the needs of the disaster victims? How did the disaster victims know how and
where to get help? And the third question referenced the TRC being represented at a
National Workshop Tsunami Lessons Learn Conference, held in Bangkok, May 2005.
In addition to these meetings, personal communication via phone and e-mail were
made to these individuals and their superiors. Dr. Sawanit, Director of International
Relations Department corresponded with Dr. Amnat Barlee, Director of the Relief and
Community Health Bureau to answer the disaster communications questions concerning
policy. Dr. Barlee delegated the response to Deputy Director Wantanee and then Ms.
Vicithra finally forwarded the response to the researcher from the International Relations
office. The policy was obtained from the National Headquarters in Bangkok, on March
10, 2006, as it was read to the researcher over the telephone. However, this policy was
not reported as “official” until March 21, 2006, via e-mail, after Dr. Kamchorn, the head
official of the National TRC, reviewed the document and gave his stamp of approval.
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In summary, then, this research project used a number of methods to study the
case of the TRC’s disaster communication policies and practices following the tsunami.
Although some of these methods may limit the generalization of these findings, the
exploratory nature of the study, the case itself, and the actual research findings all provide
valuable contributions to our knowledge of disaster communication.
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Chapter 4 Findings
Information provided in this section is based on responses to the research
questions posed to TRC personnel from all three levels of TRC disaster management.
Responses were given by representatives from the administrative level based at the TRC
national headquarters, the Provincial level based at the Governor’s mansion in Phang
Nga, and the field level, based out of the Front Line office located in Khao Lak, Thailand.
When appropriate the responses will be differentiated according to the level represented.
Findings culminating from additional documentation and secondary sources will also be
mentioned.
Chapter 9 of the International Red Cross Communication Guide entitled “Crisis
Communication” which spoke specifically of communicating during a natural disaster
was particularly relevant. It was apparent that the document contained public relations
rhetoric on how to mitigate bad publicity for the organization and increase fundraising
potential from donors.
In the case of sudden-onset disaster or a rapidly moving conflict our efficiency
and operational finesse may well come under scrutiny. And part of the service we
as professional communicators should provide to our operational colleagues is
some guidance on what to say and do if it is found wanting….Also with good
preparation in the communications sphere alone, we can guarantee at least to
reduce the impact of crises, stop ‘incidents’ turning into crises, and ensure that
sudden-onset natural disasters do not turn into public relations disasters.
(International Committee of the Red Cross, Communication Guide, 2003, Ch. 9,
¶ 9 & ¶ 14)
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This guidance raised more questions than answers concerning the disaster
communication practices of such an organization. In the mind of the researcher there was
confidence that the Red Cross always sought to respond to disasters and to provide relief
for the suffering, wounded and destitute. Therefore it was determined there must be
some national communication policy which would include disaster management
information related to assessing the needs of the population involved in the disaster,
communication of those needs to the National Red Cross organization and guidance on
how to match available resources to the needs of the masses.
A brief review of the organization of the TRC is worth mentioning. The National
TRC houses the Relief and Community Health Bureau. Disaster preparedness and
disaster response fall under the scope of activities within this bureau. Dr. Amnat Barlee is
the director of the Relief and Community Health Bureau of the National TRC.
The Provincial TRC office is located in Phang Nga City, with the Governor’s
wife, Tasana Metheevibulvut, serving as president. The provincial TRC is responsible to
coordinate and facilitate activities and projects within local communities.
Front Line gradually evolved as a TRC “field office” entity. Prior to the tsunami,
Royal Thai Army Colonel, Chinnarat Rattanajikasem, served on the Science and
Technology Committee in the Parliamentary House of Representatives, with a specialty
in the use of effective micro-organisms. Dr. Amnat Barlee requested the Colonel to
travel to Khao Lak and disseminate effective micro-organisms to reduce the foul smells
associated with decaying bodies (personal communication, July 9, 2005). The Colonel
arrived on December 28, 2004, and commenced the work with help from volunteers.
Choo was one such volunteer who had remained with Front Line and the Colonel from
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the first days of response efforts. As the Colonel and Choo were working in local
communities they saw additional problems affecting the tsunami survivors. These
problems were reported back to the national TRC. According to the Colonel, “The locals
believed we were representatives from the TRC. Then we requested to become Front
Line to the TRC and see to these problems. That is how Front Line became established
within one month’s time [of the tsunami]” (personal communication July 9, 2005).
Research Questions and Findings
Main Question: What are the disaster communication networks and disaster
communications policies of the Thai Red Cross Society?
As noted in Chapter 2, this main question was broken into several sub-questions
in order to better answer the different parts. This section will answer each sub-question in
order.
RQ1: What are the disaster communication policies of the Thai Red Cross?
There were no “written” disaster communications policies in place prior to the
December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami nor any “written” disaster communication
policies utilized during the relief and recovery period after the tsunami. This finding is
validated thru multiple interviews with TRC personnel in all three levels of the society.
Front Line personnel verbally stated there were “no communications policies” (Choo and
the Colonel), while both the Phang Nga Province TRC President and the Relief and
Community Health Bureau representatives were unable to produce a “written” document
of disaster communication policy.
The communication network of the TRC is very complex. Although the TRC
maintains they are completely independent of the government (Wantanee), as pertaining
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to the Red Cross founding principle of independence, the national disaster response plan
is overseen by the Minister of Interior (National Workshop, 2005). Choo also maintains
that the TRC is “independent” but that the connection of the TRC with the community is
through many different governmental departments, such as the Health Department
(personal communication, May 27, 2005). And, in addition, the Governor’s wife in each
Province generally holds the position of TRC Provincial President. These facts make the
disaster communication networks of the TRC inseparably tied to government entities.
(This research did not assess the disaster communication policies or practices of the Thai
Government; however, relationships between the Thai Government and TRC discussed in
official reports will be noted.)
The TRC communications network is further complicated by the fact that neither
the TRC nor governmental reporting agencies defined their meaning of
“communications” efforts. “Communications” is mentioned as a part of the response
efforts in both the official government reports and within the TRC disaster plan published
on its website. Deductive reasoning from documents and interviews points to
“communications” efforts as those types of communications which provided public
relations aspects of the disaster response and also communications that connected both
foreigners and nationals with concerned family and friends. Linking family and friends
using mobile phones is an example of this kind of telecommunications.
Telecommunications will be discussed in a following section.
An example of public relations communications was the repeated appearance of
the Prime Minister of Thailand on nationally televised broadcasts reassuring the Thai
citizens that the natural disaster would be covered with money the government held in its
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reserves (personal communication, February 2006). This message was also reiterated on
the first page of a government report of disaster response efforts stating that, “Thailand
had not requested international financial assistance following the tsunami…” (National
Workshop, 2005, p. 1).
The report was generated in May 2005 from a conference titled “National
Workshop on Tsunami Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Thailand.” Hosted by the
Thai government and the United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian
Assistance (OCHA), the main players of disaster response, both governmental agencies
and non-governmental organizations, were in attendance. Lieutenant General Dr. Amnat
Barlee, director of the Relief and Community Health Bureau, represented the Thai Red
Cross Society at the conference (e-mail from Vichitra, personal communication March
21, 2005).
The national workshop produced a publication listing strengths, weaknesses and
areas of needed improvement for disaster response. This document (National Workshop,
2005) noted under “general strengths” that the TRC was “integrated into the response at
the provincial level” (p. 2). As part of the “best practices” the major contributions of the
civil society (including the TRC) and private sector included “transportation,
telecommunications, food and water” (p. 3). This Government report not only alluded to
two types of communications, public relations and telecommunications, it also sheds
some light on disaster management systems and organization in Thailand.
Even though the TRC was integrated into the response at the provincial level,
when asked if information was exchanged between the Front Line field office and the
provincial headquarters, President Tasana reported that the Colonel over Front Line did
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not coordinate efforts through the provincial headquarters, rather he went directly to the
national headquarters for assistance because he could get what he needed through that
office much more efficiently and quickly (personal communication, August 1, 2005).
Both Front Line and the Provincial Red Cross learned through experience that assistance
came much quicker from the national headquarters than through the provincial office.
Choo clarified this detail when he stated, “Everything we do we report to the National
Red Cross, and the Provincial Red Cross if there is something they can do. But the
Provincial Red Cross does not have the ability to support us…. The help is late and
delayed as they report it [or submit requests] to the National Red Cross” (personal
communication, May 27, 2005).
The Thai Government’s Public Relations efforts ran parallel with the ICRC
Communication Guide in dealing with crisis communication. According to the ICRC
Guide (2003), disasters may initiate criticism of operational and organizational systems
and those that run the systems. To mitigate bad press and criticism, communicators are
instructed to reassure the media audience that the situation is under control and being
dealt with appropriately. The ICRC Communication Guide (2003) further addressed
image control issues in stating, “with good preparation in the communications sphere
alone, we can guarantee at least to reduce the impact of crises, stop ‘incidents’ turning
into crises, and ensure that sudden-onset natural disasters do not turn into public relations
disasters” (Chapter 9, ¶ 14). It is reasonable to conclude that the Thai Government,
which was ultimately responsible for the entire disaster response and therefore overseeing
the TRC efforts, wanted to quell any fears of economic strain for their citizens. While
discussing the Public Relation efforts with a Thai national and seeking clarification and
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reasoning for such actions from the Prime Minister, information about the economic
status of the country evolved. Thailand had recently come out of a significant economic
depression. The fear of regression to that low economic state was a legitimate fear of
many Thai citizens, and that was the probable reasoning of such televised and publicized
messages concerning the ability of the government and not requesting outside help.
Mediated messages from the government were not directed at alleviating the
suffering of the immediately affected victims of the tsunami, but rather a public relations
effort to emphasize the ability and competence of the government and civic entities in
dealing with the disaster. In addition to the government’s public relation efforts on
behalf of the TRC, it seems the TRC also utilized the ICRC Communication Guide
(2003) and public relations practices by posting fundraising information on its website
www.redcross.or.th and mobilizing citizens for volunteer efforts locally and nationally.
The disaster communication network of the TRC is complex and difficult to
define. The tsunami disaster response activities initiated under the Relief and
Community Health Bureau are inseparably intertwined with the Thai Government. Both
the TRC and the Thai Government utilized public relation communicative practices
following the Indian Ocean tsunami, with messages aimed at the general Thai population
and not directed at the immediate and most vulnerable victims.
On March 21, 2006, notification was given that the disaster communication
policy, previously received, was now “official.” Mr. Kongsiri, the TRC head
administrator, had reviewed the policy and given his approval. The policy had been
forwarded via e-mail, on March 9, from Vichitra the TRC Head Secretary for External
Relations. (See Appendix K). The policy states:
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Whenever people need help, not only during crisis, but also with family or
individual's difficulties, they can call on and request for assistance.
Communications policy, of The Thai Red Cross Society, is available with or
without crisis, since TRCS have provincial chapters and branches down to the
district level [punctuation added]. (Personal communications, March 9 and 21,
2006)
The TRC disaster communication policy proved problematic because most people
in the community did not know “the process” of how to ask for help, or even that
resources were available to them from the TRC. When Choo, the TRC field worker at
the Front Line office in Khao Lak, was asked about operations training manuals and a
disaster communications policy he retorted, “There is none! We have to collect it
[information and training]; learning by doing it. We are lucky we have the Colonel and
then some information from the Health Department” (personal communication, May 27,
2005). Choo further emphasized the lack of knowledge among the community members
concerning resources available from the TRC. “Here on the internet TRC website is
information on how to be prepared. The government and other agencies need to be
involved to transfer this information to the communities and local level. This information
is not to the other levels of the system. The local level is not able to access this
information. We [Front Line] are now working on this” (personal communication, May
27, 2005).
This “official” disaster communication policy verified that assistance from the
TRC is initiated only after a request for assistance is made. During the interview with
President Tasana, she revealed that requests for assistance could originate from private

Disaster Communication Networks 66
individuals within a community, the Ministry of Health (MOH), hospital social workers
or agents representing an individual or family, or from the provincial office requesting
assistance from the national office (personal communication, August 1, 2005); and,
according to the National Workshop Report (2005), the Minister of Interior, who is
responsible for disaster response, can also initiate a large-scale TRC response.
While not stated in any of the interviews or communications with TRC officials, a
line of division can be drawn between the types of request for assistance and the type of
TRC disaster response. Small-scale individual requests may receive a personalized
response while large-scale requests for an affected community might receive a much
larger and uniform response. President Tasana noted that once the governor received the
phone call about the tsunami, she immediately knew assistance was needed, took action
with her skeleton staff at the TRC offices, and commenced preparation of humanitarian
packets and supplies (personal communication, August 1, 2005).
One day after the tsunami, the Phang Nga TRC handed out packets containing
groceries, rice, clothing, medicine, soap and shampoo, a mosquito net and flashlight. It
was also the intent of the TRC to provide everyone with some money along with the
packet. Distribution of the packet and pocket money would be considered a uniform
large-scale disaster response. In many cases the packets were distributed to village chief
who in turn was responsible to get them to the remaining members of the village.
President Tasana further revealed that the first plan of action after a disaster is to
meet “financial needs” (personal communication Aug 1, 2005) and that the TRC takes a
facilitator’s role in coordinating with government and civic offices. While Tasana was
unsure of the disaster communication policy, the small-scale response of the Provincial
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Red Cross seemed to be consistent with what has now been defined as the “official”
disaster communication policy and waited for individual requests to meet financial needs
relating to medical expenses and restoration of livelihoods. To emphasize this point (of
assisting those in financial need) Tasana introduced for review a thick three-ringed binder
containing photographs of individuals, requests for assistance, and letters of appreciation
from those assisted (personal communication, August 1, 2005).
Effective disaster communications requires active and open sharing of
information between the victims and the responders. Front Line, organized within three
days after the tsunami, and incorporated into the TRC one month after the tsunami, filled
a great void in the TRC disaster response efforts. Five months after the tsunami, Front
Line field worker Choo, stated there were no disaster communications policies and that
he was in the process of trying to write disaster response manuals and policies from
experience with the victims, information gleaned from the internet, and other disaster
management sources (personal communication, May 27, 2005). Although Front Line did
not have disaster communications policy, their continual proactive practice was to get
into the community and, in the words of Choo, “Walk through the communities, talk to
the people and see what is needed and clear it up. We talk to the proctor, the Health
Department, and to the provincial Red Cross office and say this is needed for this
community here” (personal communication May 27, 2005). According to the Colonel
(personal communication, July 9, 2005), the initial community assessment was a
byproduct of the distribution of disaster relief packet, by Front Line volunteers.
Distributing these packets deeper into the affected areas and villages provided an intimate
look at the struggles the victims were facing.
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Front Line continued to work from a grass-roots level and as of July 9, 2005,
“modeling” had become the communication practice of choice for this TRC entity. The
Colonel stated,
We do modeling. We build models for them to study and learn. Our job is unique
in that we try to motivate the locals. We bring all these resources together and
teach the people how to deal with the help that is available to them in the
government sub districts…By working in the field, we know how to help them.
We teach them what to do instead of them waiting for help. And once we teach
them and point them in the right direction it stops the other blockages of
corruption. They know the right way to ask for help. (Personal communication,
July 9, 2005)
Although grassroots communication efforts were not and are not an official policy of the
TRC or Front Line, grass roots communication practices of Front Line significantly
guided the TRC disaster response efforts following the destructive affects of the tsunami
in Thailand.
The “official” disaster communication policy of the TRC is based on small-scale
requests for assistance and proved insufficient and inappropriate as a disaster
communication policy for the mega-disaster resulting from the Indian Ocean tsunami.
Additionally, the majority of citizens and victims of the tsunami were completely
unaware of the TRC resources and the process by which to acquire assistance. Therefore,
the disaster communications policy proved generally to be inefficient and ineffective in
relieving suffering of the majority of those immediately affected by the tsunami.
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The disaster communications practices of Front Line were especially beneficial
for the immediately affected victims of the tsunami. Front Line collected information
from the victims, assessed the actual situations, transferred the information to
governmental agencies and the National TRC offices and provided victims with vital
information and resources that improved their overall health and wellbeing.
RQ2: What communication networks, both mass communication and
interpersonal communication were utilized to disseminate messages from the TRC to
tsunami survivors?
The National TRC website www.redcross.or.th lists a page on disaster
preparedness and disaster response. Although this page contains information appropriate
for dissemination to disaster victims, Choo (personal communication, May 27, 2005)
noted that “the transfer of information” does not make it to the local levels because “the
local level is not able to access this information.”
The government report (National Workshop, 2005) specifically noted that, “The
contribution of the Thai civil society and private sectors…can hardly be overestimated.
Major areas of contribution included…telecommunications…” (p. 3). The
telecommunications effort was again emphasized in a Red Cross Red Crescent (2005)
article entitled “Waves of Destruction” detailing the Red Cross humanitarian efforts
throughout the tsunami affected zones. Within the article is an image of an Asian-looking
woman holding a large mobile communication device with a Red Cross representative
standing behind her and someone helping her hold the device from the front.
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http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2005_1/4-9.html article
© Reuter/Yves Merman, courtesy
It must be noted that the disaster response of “communications” was never plotted
on any kind of time line within the government report (National Workshop, 2005) or the
Red Cross publications. The government report (National Workshop, 2005) does
however mention that great areas of improvement need to be made in setting up “backup
emergency communication system(s), utilizing HF and VHF radios and including local
radio operators” because “excessive reliance on wireless telephones created
communications problems in the early days” (p. 5). According to many reports from
Khao Lak locals and foreign nationals affected by the tsunami, the overload of cellular
phone networks and outages of telecommunications towers created significant
communication problems during the first few weeks following the tsunami.
The National TRC set up a communications center on the island of Phuket, 100
km (62 miles) away from the Phang Nga disaster affected zone of Khao Lak. Phuket
Island is separated from the mainland of Thailand by a single bridge estimated to be less
than one km (0.62 miles) in length. Known for its tourist appeal and First World
amenities, Phuket’s civil infrastructure supported many disaster response activities for the
majority of the affected Thai Provinces. Phuket is home to an international airport,
several hospitals, including specialty hospitals and the international hospital utilized by
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many tourists. During the Christmas and New Year’s holidays the island was packed
with foreigners and nationals alike. After the morning of December 26, 2004, many
tsunami victims eventually ended up on Phuket either to be treated in the hospitals,
evacuated by plane, or in search of missing loved ones. Even though the TRC
communications center was positioned far away from the foreign and national victims in
Khao Lak, locating the center on Phuket Island was the most appropriate place for
accessibility and effectiveness with the limited available resources. As previously
mentioned, the TRC served in a facilitator role for coordination of relief efforts (personal
communication, August 1, 2005) in addition to providing telecommunications services
for the victims (National Workshop, 2005; Red Cross Red Crescent, 2005). The TRC
communications center provided a place for these activities to take place.
Although telecommunications was noted as a way for the victims to be in contact
with family and vice versa, telecommunications was not mentioned as a communication
system to disseminate messages from the TRC to the immediately affected victims within
the Phang Nga Province. In fact, there were no known mass communication efforts made
by the National and Provincial TRC to communicate with the immediately affected
victims of the tsunami. However, by late May 2005, the Royal Thai Army completed
construction of the first radio tower within the Takuapa District of Phang Nga Province.
President Tasana mentioned that for future disaster communication the radio tower would
be used “as needed” by the Provincial TRC (personal communication, August 1, 2005).
The fact that the National and Provincial TRC made no communication efforts to
exchange information with the immediately affected victims in the “hardest hit Province”
(Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and Thailand Ministry of Interior,
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2005; Merlin-Scholtes, 2005) of Phang Nga is troubling. It is troubling because disaster
management delegates of the TRC received disaster preparedness and disaster response
training from the Sphere Project as early as 2002 (International Federation of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent, South East Asia Update, 2002).
According to the Sphere Project Handbook (2004), the Project’s first “process and
people” standard is participation. This means participation of the people or population
immediately affected by the disaster in all cycles of the project. Participation requires
communication: both communicating with the victims and also receiving communication
from the victims. The project calls for transparency throughout all involved groups
(responding humanitarian organizations, immediately affected populations, government
agencies and donors) for the best coordination efforts. One would assume that the TRC
would have utilized this specific disaster response training during the tsunami aftermath.
Without the specialized Sphere training, Front Line was still the only TRC entity
to systematically communicate with the masses of tsunami survivors. Front Line utilized
grassroots, door-to-door, person-to-person communication to simultaneously gather
information from the tsunami victims and disseminate messages to the villagers during
the relief, recovery and rebuilding phases of disaster response (personal communication,
May 27 and July 9, 2005). Choo stated, “Communications and broadcasts on TV is not
effective. It’s more effective to come in person and then the information about disasters
is taken more seriously” (personal communication, May 27, 2005).
Consequently, Front Line received some criticism that they were “spoiling” the
villagers by providing them with specific health information and creating an efficient
communication system (personal communication May 27 and July 9, 2005). Choo
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(personal communication, May 27, 2005) expressed his frustration with the current
system of inefficient and inhibiting communication patterns, which, he felt, placed
information sharing with the victims as a last priority of disaster response. His personal
belief was that information sharing with the victims should be a high priority of disaster
response. He stated, “Interestingly there is an attitude that we are spoiling the people by
taking health information to them in person. The information is completely low level, I
feel” (personal communication, May 27, 2005).
According to the IFRC (International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent, South East Asia Update, 2002), after the disaster management and Sphere
Program training throughout South East Asia, “the need to develop information-gathering
networks (had) been recognized” (p. 4), however there were constraints impeding the
process. The major constraint noted in the 2002 report was that national Red Cross
societies wanted to utilize their own resources and they did not want or desire “rapid
outside intervention;” additionally, the process of developing information-gathering and
information-sharing networks might be impeded by “political environments, rigid
organization cultures, and a lack of human and information technology facilities” (p. 4).
The success of Front Line in mitigating the suffering of the immediate affected
tsunami victims, along with criticism of their communication practices, could well be due
to the fact that Colonel Chinnarat Rattanajikasem did not originate in the TRC or disaster
management culture. The Colonel’s professional background is broad and diverse.
According to the Colonel, he was able to assist community members because of his
background and professional training as a psychologist and psychiatrist, lawyer, social
worker, and as a doctor of herbal medicine and also massage therapy. In addition,
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because of his government position and military background, he knew the appropriate
government channels to address issues and solve problems efficiently (personal
communication July 9, 2005). His experiences and training allowed the Colonel a
knowledge base to efficiently gather information concerning community and personal
needs, find resources to meet those needs and appropriately guide the tsunami victims to
be proactive in solving their own problems. (personal communication, July 9, 2005).
The Colonel took his responsibility to the people very personally. He walked
through the villages, talked to the people, assessed situations and personally took action
at the grass-roots level of the tsunami-affected society. The Colonel stated, “We know
the community and we know the village...(There are) many problems of (concerning)
water, health, and basic needs, along with (needed) social and emotional help…Health
problems affect every part. Someone else’s health problem becomes my health problem”
(personal communication, July 9, 2005).
The Colonel’s interactions and assessments from the grass-roots level of society
were reported to the top levels within the TRC and government agencies. The Colonel’s
actions provided the villagers with desperately needed resources, information and
knowledge.
RQ3: How did the TRC acquire information about community needs in the Phang
Nga Province?
RQ3a: Who communicated with whom about community needs?
The transfer of information from tsunami-affected communities to the TRC was
initiated by Front Line. Front Line was the only TRC entity that was proactive in its
method of acquiring and disseminating information within the tsunami affected
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communities. Front Line directly interacted with victims of the tsunami and performed
community assessments. From these grass-roots efforts within villages, information
concerning the needs of the people surfaced. Once needs were identified, the Colonel
forwarded requests for resources to the TRC head office in Bangkok. Because of his
professional training, concerns identified by the Colonel were immediately addressed.
Under his direction, Front Line was proactive in responding to issues and concerns with
information, training and resources. The Colonel and Front Line volunteers empowered
villagers and community leaders by teaching them how to appropriately deal with
government entities and how to solve their own problems “now and in the future”
(personal communication, July 9, 2005).
Colonel Chinnarat was a master of problem solving and caught a vision of the
ability of Front Line to empower others to solve their own problems. To achieve this
vision, the Colonel devised a simple, flexible, and concise formula for managing and
solving problems. The formula is easy to understand and transferable to multiple agents
working to solve specific and/or varied problems.
Colonel Chinnarat’s problem solving formula. The formula is: I, T to the power
of three, C to the power of 4 (I T3 C4). I equals information or intelligence. T3 equals
technology, terrain and time. C4 is coordination, communication, command and control.
Quoting directly from Colonel Chinnarat concerning his formula for solving problems, he
stated with enthusiasm:
Information and Intelligence, this is what we do in Frontline. Frontline is I. We
gather information and tell the TRC the problems. We say this and this and this
are the problems.
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T1 is Technology. Computer and digital photos. With the internet there is a
quick transfer of I (information and intelligence). The timing is fast and effective.
T2 is Terrain: this is the surrounding area, the cultures, the customs, and the
habits of the people.
T3 is Time: Can you solve this problem in a timely manner? A day, a week, a
month? The problem must be solved as soon as possible. Frontline tries to solve
problems fast.
C1 is Coordination: it is good to have coordination between organizations.
C2 is Communication: must use local languages so locals can have a good
exchange of information. (Locals must understand you and you must understand
them.)
C3 is Command: who is in charge and who is the leader?
C4 is Control: Evaluation and Assessment. Information is sent to government
officials and then they send needs and resources to solve the problems. (They
must evaluate and reassess to see if the problem is really solved).
It is a good formula for solving problems. (personal communication, July 9, 2005)
I=Information and Intelligence.
T3=Technology, Terrain, Time
C4=Coordination, Communication, Command, Control
Personal observations of Front Line activities from the end of May to early
August, 2005, corresponded with several points of the Colonel’s problem solving
formula. The Colonel and Choo were witnessed going into small villages, speaking with
the people, gathering information and following up on previous community problems.
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Both the Colonel and Choo made use of technology by carrying digital cameras and
cellular phones at all times and utilizing the internet on a regular basis. These men knew
the “terrain” of the area. Local languages were spoken while sensitivity was given to
local cultures in addition to observation of local customs. While in a small community
off the main road between Khao Lak and Takuapa, an inquiry about Front Line was made
to see if anyone knew Colonel Chinnarat or Choo. The village leader, who happened to
speak English, knew who the men were and the purpose of Front Line. From this it was
gathered that the people know who was in command and who had the ability to help the
village.
Colonel Chinnarat’s success in the community stemmed not only from utilizing
his problem-solving formula but also in the way he trained volunteers and community
leaders. His “technique” for training revolves around a core group of dependable
individuals who he personally trains. According to the Colonel (personal
communication, July 9, 2005), these “few in the center” dispersed into communities and
villages and asked “the community to gather as a group and have them pick a leader from
their group;” once the village picked their own leader, “then the group helps themselves.”
He further states, “We teach them, make manuals for them, but they are the team.”
One example of how Front Line helped to solve a community problem comes from
the building of a catfish farm. The tsunami destroyed many fishing boat, shrimp farms
and agricultural livelihoods within the Khao Lak area. Without boats, nets and rigging,
the fishermen were unable to put food on the table of their families and provide other
necessities. Front Line assessed the situation and researched the possibility of starting
catfish farming within the area. A community-based catfish farm was built with village
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residents engaged in the activity. Colonel Chinnarat reported that the community-based
model of catfish farming was quickly replicated as other “locals became interested and
wanted to be involved with it and learn how to have catfish in their backyard” (personal
communication, July 9, 2005).
The purpose of the catfish project was not only to provide food and income for
the community members, but also to empower communities with an ability to manage
their own problems. The catfish project was an attempt to create a “sustainable project”
that would thrive once Front Line pulled away and left the project in the community’s
care (personal communication, May 27, 2005).
As Front Line accomplished the goal of empowering communities to solve their
own problems, the Colonel did not remove all Front Line resources (personal
communication, July 9, 2005). In fact, the Colonel was on-call to answer questions and
give suggestions when needed. He noted that if leaders struggle “they will ask for help,”
and if problems halt progression, “they call us and ask for suggestions.” However, stated
Colonel Chinnarat, “Today, they feel confident in their abilities to solve their own
problems and make use of the main governmental organizations” (personal
communication, July 9, 2005).
RQ4: According to the TRC, were the community’s needs met?
RQ4a: How does the TRC evaluate their effectiveness in disaster communication?
At the National TRC level, Wantanee responded that the “Community needs were
met because people had food, water, and money” (personal communication, February 1,
2006). Officials at the Provincial level deferred responding to this question along with
the question referring to disaster communication policy.
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Front Line knew the needs of the people and provided resources, information and
direction to meeting those needs. Front Line empowered community members with
knowledge and abilities to solve their own immediate and future problems. When asked
if Front Line was effective in its efforts, both the Colonel and Choo verbalized that this
grass-roots effort to engage the villagers in solving their own problems was very
effective. Colonel Chinnarat stated,
We are taking this opportunity to come with all these ideas and projects to teach
the community how to get properly organized within their own community…
Grass roots effort, yes, yes, grass roots. Effective, yes! If the people can help
themselves then we can help them. If they cannot help themselves then we cannot
help them. (personal communication, July 9, 2005)
Village residents who are educated on disaster preparedness and empowered with
knowledge on how to deal with government agencies request less and less help from
Front Line. Effectiveness of Front Line’s grass roots efforts are therefore measured by
monitoring how the villages are doing on their own and the amount of assistance they
require from the Colonel. “If the leaders can not do it on their own, they will come and
ask for help from me. If there is any problem that stops their progression then they call
us and ask for suggestions. Today they feel confident that they can make use of the main
(government) organizations” (personal communication, July 9, 2005).
The National TRC reported that the needs of the tsunami disaster victims were
immediately met in the Phang Nga affected communities with food, water and money.
Front Line, which was not fully integrated into the TRC until one month after the
tsunami, reported their grass roots efforts in assessing needs and allocating resources to
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meet those needs were effective. The efforts of these two groups were positive, but a
retrospective look at the disaster situation and the response efforts revealed areas that
needed improvement.
The magnitude of this disaster challenged every responding organization. Noji
(2005b) used the term “mega-disaster” to describe the enormity and multi-faceted nature
of this disaster and the wide path of destruction left in the wake of the giant waves. The
path of destruction did not discriminate between foreigners, nationals or illegal
immigrants and everyone within the path of the giant wave was affected.
The Andaman Sea laps at the shores of South Western Thailand and Southern
Myanmar (formerly known as Burma). Many Burmese illegal immigrants reside in the
Phang Nga Province of Thailand. The agricultural industry of South Eastern Thailand
relies heavily on the Burmese workforce. Many Burmese worked illegally in Thailand as
fisherman, agricultural laborers and construction workers. The South Eastern coastline of
Thailand is covered with rubber tree, coconut tree and pineapple plantations. The influx
of tourism in Khao Lak over the last 10 years, resulted in many construction projects and
produced approximately 6000 hotel rooms before the tsunami. After the tsunami, only
600 rooms remained (Tourism Authority of Thailand, 2005; Birkland, T., Herabat, P.,
Little, R. & Wallace, W., 2005). Along the Khao Lak coast, dozens of tourist hotels stand
as hollow frames.
From May to August, 2005, and January to March, 2006, the researcher witnessed
thousands of Burmese immigrant families squatting on hotel property, in corrugated steel
shacks, and working on the reconstruction of the large hotels demolished by the
mammoth tsunami waves. Mile after mile the cacophony of saws, hammering and general
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construction efforts filled the air from the first light of day to last ray of sun at night.
Foreign-owned hotels were not the only employers of the illegal Burmese workers.
While in the company of Royal Thai Military officers, Burmese squatters doing
construction labor on the King’s Project (a four story school with three separate buildings
for students ranging from primary to high school), were identified along with their living
quarters situated close by.
The Burmese immigrants were vulnerable before the tsunami and suffered greatly
afterwards. Reports from locals and foreigners within the tsunami-affected area revealed
that the illegal Burmese immigrants who survived the tsunami fled to the mountains
when the water receded. Injured, hungry and destitute, these people were too scared of
being taken to prison or deported back to Burma (Myanmar), to seek help from the Thai
officials. The Phuket Gazette is the main daily newspaper in the disaster-affected region
and reported that the bodies of many Burmese were rarely identified or collected by their
surviving family members (“Krabi Tsunami Corpses,” 2005). On several occasions the
researcher was informed that the surviving migrant Burmese did not identify or collect
their relative’s bodies because of fear of being imprisoned or deported if discovered by
Thai authorities.
Because the TRC operates on seven founding principles, two of which are
humanitarianism and neutrality, constant enquiry about the Burmese victims and
assistance provided for them was carefully and constantly avoided not only by TRC
personnel, but also by high-ranking military personnel responsible for the Thai
government response and rebuilding efforts. Confused by the reaction, the question was
posed to a trusted Thai informant who volunteers with the Phuket Red Cross and also
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offered her services within the Phang Nga Province after the tsunami. She revealed that
she could not answer the questions about the Burmese because that information was
“sensitive” (personal communication, December 15, 2005). (Because of the “sensitivity”
to the subject of Burmese immigrants, the identity of some information sources will not
be disclosed here.)
Unwilling to place Thai friends in compromising positions, questioning
concerning the Burmese situation stopped. However, the Tsunami Lessons Learned
Report (National Workshop, 2005) validated concern for the Burmese and noted that the
immigrant and minority populations were not provided with the needed assistance and
that progress needed to be made in this disaster response area within Thailand. The
reaction of the TRC to questions about the Burmese and the information gleaned from the
National Workshop (2005) Report, leads to the facts that there was a great disparity
between those who actually received help from the TRC and those who did not. Many of
the Burmese fisherman and agricultural workers did not receive the help they needed.
Common sense states that relief should be provided in a timely manner. During
the interviews with TRC personnel, the concept of timely disaster relief was briefly
discussed. During the first three days after the disaster, the TRC specifically mentioned
the distribution of relief packets as the major relief activity. But General Amnat Barlee
must have known the situation was desperate and additional relief was needed
immediately. Both Colonel Chinnarat and Choo noted that “Front Line was organized
because the traditional Red Cross did not know what to do” and “the TRC was confused
to know how to help” so many people (personal communication, July 9, 2005). But it was
not only the TRC struggling to help the victims, but the government, community services,
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other relief organizations, and international volunteers and agencies converging on the
disaster affected area fumbling along in their relief efforts. According to the Colonel, “It
was a mess! There was no organization” or coordination of relief efforts in the beginning
(personal communication, July 9, 2005).
Several factors governed the inability of the TRC to response to the disaster in a
more efficient, effective and timely manner. A culmination of comments from all levels
of the TRC and the official National Workshop (2005) report led to the following
conclusions. There was a lack of appropriately trained disaster management volunteers
and personnel within the TRC (personal communication, August 1, 2005; National
Workshop, 2005). There was a massive overabundance of inappropriate donations that
placed unnecessary strain on the overburdened TRC personnel (personal communication,
May 27, July 9 and August 1, 2005; National Workshop, 2005).
The sheer magnitude of the disaster made it impossible for one organization to
respond to “all” the victims’ needs; and, according to the Colonel, without appropriate
coordination of efforts between the many responding organizations there was still many
problems. One can only wonder if a quicker integration of Front Line into the TRC
would have produced a different level of efficiency and effectiveness in disaster response
efforts.
The lack of appropriately trained disaster responders could be due to the fact that
TRC “training” is provided to the provincial presidents every two months. Although
President Tasana goes to Bangkok every two months for “training,” there is no
perpetuation of the knowledge and skill, at the provincial level, among provincial TRC
staff or volunteers (personal communication, August 1, 2005). Therefore, at the time of
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the tsunami, President Tasana shouldered a very heavy responsibility for disaster
management within her province.
In addition to trying to coordinate humanitarian disaster packet distribution,
President Tasana was required, along with her skeleton staff and handful of volunteers to
deal with a logistical nightmare of storing and distributing a mountain of inappropriate
donations for the relief efforts (personal communication, August 1, 2005). The situation
became so desperate and unmanageable that several Buddhist temples were stacked to the
ceiling with thousands of large bags full of donated supplies. The remnants of such
donations were seen many months later lining the roadways to the temporary housing
locations. While visiting the temporary housing village of Bang Sak, a rooster stood atop
a pile of black garbage bags containing donated clothing that the villagers could not use
or just didn’t want. Tsunami Volunteers, a charitable organization within the region, is
now helping locals find ways to use the fabric from such clothing in profitable ways.
“Tsunami dolls,” as the flat gingerbread-shaped dolls are called, are now sold to tourists
and provide an income for some of the tsunami victims.
Needless to say, analysis of the effectiveness of the TRC disaster response efforts
and disaster communication networks raises questions about what could have worked
better. When Deputy Director Wantanee of the National TRC Relief and Community
Health Bureau was informed that the hope for this research was to improve disaster
communication networks specific to the needs of the immediately-affected disaster
victims, she exclaimed that her bureau was also working on this kind of an improvement
in communication, assessment, and appropriate allocation of resources. Communication
plays a major role in disaster response efforts. Wantanee’s response revealed that
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appropriate disaster communication [the sharing of information between the immediately
affected victims of the disaster and the responders] can only lead to greater effectiveness
in all aspects of disaster response.
General Findings
The TRC disaster response network is interwoven within the fabric of the Thai
government’s disaster prevention and mitigation policy. The Prime Minister of Thailand
is responsible for disaster response and the Ministry of Interior directs the efforts. The
ability of the TRC to independently respond to a disaster is thus inhibited by the
overarching political influence. Although TRC delegates received disaster preparedness
and disaster response training (Sphere Project, 2004) in 2002, and reported at the
International Red Cross Convention, in 2003, that they were going to “study and modify
the recommendations of the Sphere Project and adapt them to local needs and
particularities” (International Committee of the Red Cross, Follow-up, 2003, p. 30-31),
the recommendations to develop information gathering systems related to disaster
management had not been implemented by the TRC at the time of the tsunami.
The Sphere Project’s (2004) first “process and people” standard is participation.
This means participation of the people or population immediately affected by the disaster
in all cycles of the project. Participation requires communication: a transfer of
information between victims and responders. The Sphere Project (2004) training calls for
transparency amongst all responding organizations, humanitarian entities, governmental
agencies and possible donors and that information is shared accordingly with the victims
and immediately affected population. A system of direct communication with
immediately affected populations of a disaster had not been established, by the TRC,
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prior to the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean Tsunami; nor has such a system or the
recommendations of the Sphere Project been adapted as of March 2006.
The TRC disaster communication policy notes neither diffusion nor participatory
models of disaster communications. Their disaster communication policy requires that
individuals in the community request assistance from the TRC before action is taken.
This was further illustrated by President Tasana Metheevibulvut as she showed the files
of individuals that had received assistance from the Provincial TRC Chapter. She
commented on the process of providing assistance stating that a social worker, hospital
employee or a Ministry of Health (MOH) official many times initiated the formal request
for help (personal communication, August 1, 2005).
Although the official disaster communication policy of the TRC does not denote
diffusion or participatory communication methods, Colonel Chinnarat Rattanjikasem’s
work in the disaster-affected communities is characterized by participatory
communication methods. The Colonel and his assistant, Choo Samee, empowered
individuals and communities to sort out their own problems and take control of their own
situations. They did this by going into the villages, talking to the people, collecting and
sharing information, and also modeling appropriate ways to work with government
entities (personal communication, July 9, 2005).
The main finding of this research is that disaster communications within the
discipline of mass communications has been significantly slanted to public relations
tactics revolving around corporate image protection and fundraising efforts. Because of
this, there is a significant lack of information for both researchers and humanitarian
workers on the best ways to communicate with the people immediately affected by a
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disaster. The discipline of health and medicine offers models of communication and
fundamental principles of assessment and information-gathering which can be applied in
these situations.

Disaster Communication Networks 88
Chapter 5 Discussion
A Policy That Can Not Be Implemented Effectively Is No Policy At All
The paramount finding of this research emerged as initial research documents
were analyzed for information concerning the general topic of disaster communications.
The papers, books and documents being analyzed were all found during EBSCO searches
under the discipline of communications or from Google searches using the terms disaster
or crisis or emergency in combination with the term communication(s). Review of these
papers, books and documents created great frustration and disbelief. Each reviewed
source referred to public relations tactics aimed at influencing general audiences not
immediately affected by the disaster; yet, these sources completely neglected any
mention of communications between immediate victims and responding agencies striving
to mitigate effects of disasters on the life and health of these victims.
From these initial searches the paramount finding emerged: the discipline of
communications has overlooked the most vulnerable audiences following a disaster. This
void, disaster communication with an immediate victim audience, is beckoning to be
filled by further research and techniques that will benefit future disaster victims. The
disciplines of health and development provide an appropriate starting point for future
study and research leading to more holistic disaster communications practices.
After struggling for several weeks to find disaster communications information
(which this thesis defines as communicating with the masses immediately affected by the
disaster), exasperated and discouraged with the public relations answers, a search outside
the discipline of communications and within the discipline of medicine was started. It
was there that was found some information on assessing the situation of the victims and
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providing relief according to those assessments (Campbell, 2005; Disaster Management,
2004; Noji, 2005b). It became exceptionally clear that patterns of disaster
communications policies and practices could be organized under different disciplines
such as communications, medicine/health and development, to name a few. Here lies the
possible answer to many of the disaster communications problems discussed and highly
publicized during the aftermath of both the Asian tsunami and most recently Hurricane
Katrina in New Orleans (Comfort, 2005).
These complex humanitarian disasters (Noji, 2005a) are multi-faceted and require
a multitude of methods and theories from varying disciplines to alleviate the suffering of
the immediately affected victims (Schiavo, 2005). If policy governs humanitarian
response efforts, then disaster communication policy should be created and implemented
with the main focus on mitigating the effects of disasters on the most vulnerable
populations and not as corporate image protection policy. Image protection and
fundraising was the main basis of the ICRC’s Crisis Communication Guide (2003) prior
to the Indian Ocean tsunami. Both the ICRC’s communication guide and the TRC’s
disaster communication policy were ineffective as disaster communication tools and
disaster mitigation agents. The lack of information exchange between the responding
Red Cross agencies and the immediate victims is evidence of this unfortunate condition.
According to the Select Bipartisan Committee (2006), of the United States
Congress, investigating the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the first place to review the
effectiveness of disaster response efforts is to review policy. Because there is a vast lifeand-death difference between theory and practice of policy creation and policy

Disaster Communication Networks 90
implementation, “A policy that can not be implemented effectively is no policy at all,”
(Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006, p. ix).
As the incidences and magnitude of natural disasters are ever increasing
(International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society, Disaster
Management, 2004), issues surrounding the topic of disaster communication are plentiful.
A few of the issues brought to the forefront relate specifically to victim participation,
information exchange, and transparency of both policy and practice in the coordination of
relief efforts (Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006; National Workshop, 2005).
Appropriate exchange of information between the victims and the responders, and
transparency of relief efforts between responding organizations, can mitigate the effects
of disaster to save more lives and livelihoods.
The purpose of this thesis was to research and analyze the disaster communication
network of the TRC. As the discussion follows, it is not the researcher’s intent to be
critical or debasing of the TRC as an organization. Rather, the purpose of this analysis is
to provide significant information that can further mitigate the effects of future disasters.
The disconnect between the TRC disaster communication policy and the need to mitigate
the effects of the disaster on the most vulnerable populations may be the tip of a
communications iceberg for many developing countries striving to work within the
standards of international humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross.
The following discussion will highlight possible pitfalls inhibiting nongovernmental humanitarian organizations (NGHO), in developing countries, from
working within international standards for disaster response. A discussion of Front
Line’s grassroots disaster response efforts will show that flexibility and initiative lead to
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effective disaster response. This section will conclude with a petition for multidisciplinary cooperation towards developing disaster communication theory and a
proposed model offered by the researcher.
The question arises whether the humanitarian organizations of developing nations
will truly be able to implement the full scope of standards and principles guiding their
international counterparts. Since the TRC is a member of the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, one would think that ICRC Code of Conduct (1995) (See
Appendix L) would be incorporated and followed closely. The Code of Conduct “brings
together the classical humanitarian principles of humanity, independence, neutrality and
impartiality, along with modern principles derived from development: accountability,
partnership, participation and even sustainability” (Hilhorst, 2005, p. 3). However,
“because it does not prescribe a hierarchy of principles, one can argue that the
Fundamental Principles have become contingent” (Hilhorst, 2005, p. 3).
As stated earlier, the purpose of this research was to determine the TRC disaster
communication network, policies and practices. The findings of the research reflect an
absence of adherence to the paramount guiding principles upon which the Red Cross is
based. The findings unequivocally show that the TRC was not able to uphold the Red
Cross Code of Conduct in their disaster response efforts. The TRC neglected to utilize the
Sphere (2004) recommendations in its disaster response efforts and, therefore, neglected
abiding by several important Red Cross principles and standards. The Sphere Project’s
(2004) minimum standards for disaster response incorporate both the ICRC Fundamental
Principles and the Code of Conduct (1995) governing the Movement’s actions during a
disaster.
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The TRC disaster communication policy proved inadequate not only as a tool for
disaster mitigation, but also as a guide for appropriate disaster response efforts. The first
Sphere standard of disaster response is participation, meaning the participation of disaster
victims in all aspects of disaster response activities. This standard is also evident in the
IFRC’s disaster policies. According to the IFRC disaster preparedness and emergency
response policies to which the TRC is responsible to be compliant, participation of the
beneficiaries in disaster preparedness and response activities is essential (International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Disaster Preparedness Policy, 1999;
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Emergency Response
Policy, 1997). The TRC made no mention of either of these policies governing its own
disaster communication efforts. And reference to this standard of participation is
completely missing in the TRC disaster communication policy.
When TRC administrators were asked about a disaster communication policy, it
took more than seven months to obtain the “policy” from the TRC. The slow response of
the TRC in producing the policy, and the difficulty experienced by the researcher in
obtaining it from TRC authorities, signified two things. First, it illustrated the lack of
importance of such a document within the TRC disaster mitigation sector. Second, it
showed that the Sphere Project training had neither been diffused throughout the TRC
community nor implemented into disaster response policy.
The disaster communication policy that was finally produced is fully based on the
victim taking the first initiative by asking for help (see Appendix K for the written
disaster communication policy). However, the majority of disaster victims, who were
Thai nationals and immigrant workers, neither knew the policy nor the process by which
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to obtain assistance from the TRC (C. Rattanajikasem, & C. Samee, personal
communication, July 9, 2005). This evidence shows that the standard of participation was
missing during the initial TRC relief efforts. The minimum standards of disaster
response (Sphere Project, 2004) were not only missing in policy, but also practice.
Challenges of Maintaining Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
So what inhibited the TRC from following the basic Fundamental Principles and
Code of Conduct in their disaster response efforts? This study identifies several possible
inhibiting factors and a short list of contingencies will be offered. This list of
contingencies may affect not only the TRC’s ability to uphold its organizational
standards, but also other NGHO’s abilities to uphold similar standards as well. In order
for this study to have the impact that is possible, the TRC must honestly evaluate itself by
take a careful critical look at its organizational structure, disaster response efforts,
disaster response policies and actual disaster response practices and be wiling to make the
needed changes to improve disaster mitigation efforts.
Developed World Bias
The ICRC Code of Conduct (1995) has been written with a developed world bias.
The code was written by eight humanitarian organizations, including the ICRC and IFRC,
with the intent of standardizing the humanitarian response during a disaster. The code
“seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact to which
humanitarian response NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement aspire” (International Committee of the Red Cross, Code of Conduct, 1995, p.
1). The developed world bias is evident in this statement that humanitarian NGOs are
independent of governments. As will be shown hereafter, NGHOs are not always
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independent of governments in the developing world. Also, the measures for
effectiveness and impact are subjective and can greatly vary between economically stable
first world nations and subsidy-dependent developing nations.
Hilhorst (2005) noted that several articles of the ICRC Code of Conduct (1995)
are difficult for struggling developing nations to utilize appropriately because of a lack of
understanding concerning the hierarchal relevance of “humanitarianism” as the first
Fundamental Principle of the Red Cross. She suggested this lack of understanding is
present because contextual meaning for such principles as humanity, neutrality and
impartiality is absent within the situational realm of some developing nations. According
to Hilhort (2005), the Code of Conduct is not followed for three reasons. First, because
organizational interests sometimes prevail over humanitarian imperatives and this is
“especially damning for NGOs” (p. 5.). Second, the translation of impartiality “in the
policy realm, can be problematic and ambiguous” because the term is “often
compromised by budgetary restrictions, operational constraints or limitations imposed by
militia or other local authorities” (p. 5). And finally, the issue of neutrality is dealt with
in such an “awkward and ambiguous way that it offers little guidance to NGOs…” (p. 6).
Although the concepts of humanity, neutrality and impartiality are all subjective, the
variance of subjectivity is less from the developed or first world perspective. This
common understanding amongst the first world is known as the developed world bias
(Hilhorst, 2005).
The struggles that humanitarian organizations based in developing nations
experience in following the Code could well be due to this developed world bias in its
wording (Hilhorst, 2005). Therefore, a Westernized or Developed World bias is the first
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possible contingency affecting the proper adherence to the Code of Conduct. To remove
this possible contingency, Hilhorst (2005) called for “the wording of the entire code (to)
be adjusted to eradicate its bias towards International Non-Government Organizations,
and to make it equally relevant to local NGOs” (p. 17).
Clarification of terms and transparency of disaster response practices. If the
Code of Conduct is to be rewritten, then clarification of the terms “impartiality” and
“neutrality” should be included and allow for the diversity experienced by nonindustrialized nations and developing countries (Hilhorst, 2005). For instance, if a local
humanitarian agency is unable to access a vulnerable group following a natural disaster,
because of logistical or political constraints, then they should act in a transparent way.
By acting in a transparent way, the impediments they face in providing services are
known to all. With humanitarian organizations knowing the limits and abilities of one
another, those not inhibited would then have an opportunity to provide the needed
services to the vulnerable population.
Once these terms are clarified to allow for the contextual diversities of third world
and developing nations, then structure can be given to the principles of impartiality and
neutrality within those struggling nations. This will allow for more organizational
transparency that can lead to improved coordination between disaster response
organizations. In the situation faced by the TRC, this would have been exceptionally
helpful for the Burmese immigrant laborers who were seriously neglected by
humanitarian relief agencies immediately following the tsunami (National Workshop,
2005).
Undocumented Burmese laborers have worked in Thailand for many years.

Disaster Communication Networks 96
According to Thornton (2006), in an effort to escape the Burmese military dictatorship
and the “world’s longest civil war—57 years” (p. xi), people of Burma and especially the
Karen minority seek refuge and work along the Thai-Burma border. These illegal
immigrants have provided Thailand with an agricultural and construction workforce that
supports much of the economic growth along the Andaman Coast. These laborers have
never been officially recognized by the Thai government nor included in census reports.
According to a legal, English-speaking, Burmese immigrant who was trying to help the
Burmese refugees throughout the Khao Lak area, “If the government of Thailand
officially recognized the Burmese population in this area, they would have to provide
services for them, and they just won’t do that. The Burmese receive no help from the
Thai government” (personal communication, January 25, 2006).
If the TRC had been able to give contextual meaning to the principles of
impartiality and neutrality concerning the social and political situations of the Burmese
immigrants, they may have been able to speak more openly about the situation and at
least directed other relief organizations to this vulnerable population. Instead, the TRC
remained silent because it was a “sensitive issue.” Its silence, along with the silence of
the government and the military, only exacerbated the impact of the disaster on this group
of Burmese refugees.
Cultural Implications
Culture plays a role in perception of situations and the construction of events.
Servaes and Arnst (1999) stated that culture is visible in the way people “perceive and
interact with the world” and with others who “share similar perceptions” (p. 120). “It is
precisely such shared, often unarticulated and sometimes inarticulable patterns of
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perception, communication, and behavior that are referred to as a culture,” (Servaes &
Arnst, 1999, p. 120). Dalrymple (2004) reported that “culture is the context that nurtures
the individual and all cultures have positive, existential [lived experience] and negative
elements” (p. 6, pdf).
The Code of Conduct speaks of respecting the culture in which humanitarian
efforts are carried out. Hilhorst (2005) noted that the statement “respecting the culture”
leaves plenty of interpretive meanings for humanitarian agencies to sort through. For
instance, what if the suppression of women and genital mutilation of young girls is the
cultural norm within the village, community or country that requires humanitarian aid
(Hilhorst, 2005)? Is there both acceptable culture and reprehensible culture? And what if
the cultural practices impede the process of delivering life-saving aid to the most
vulnerable victims of a disaster? There is a growing consensus based on international
norms of human rights and international law that some so-called “cultural practices”
conflict with these norms and should be eliminated.
There are definitely ethical dilemmas to hurdle when it comes to respecting
culture and promoting health. Dalrymple (2004) stated, “To tamper with cultural forms
might be to affront people’s dignity and humanity. On the other hand, in a rapidly
changing society people are seeking the knowledge and skills to drive change and take
responsibility for their choices” (¶ 2, html). In order to deliver humanitarian relief during
a disaster or promote healthy lifestyles during times of tranquility, an organization or
individual must approach the targeted group with cultural sensitivity. Dalrymple (2004)
further suggested that “working in a cultural context means promoting the positive,
affirming and recognizing lived experiences and contextualizing the negative with a view
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to bring about useful change” (p. 6, pdf).
So what role did culture play in the TRC’s response efforts? There are at least
two different cultures intermingling in the scenario of disaster relief. The first
identifiable culture is that of the humanitarian agency. The culture of the TRC is based
on the International Red Cross Founding Principles. Humanitarianism is the foremost
guiding principle that culturally binds all entities of the Red Cross Movement together.
The second identifiable culture in disaster relief is that of Thailand and its people. So
what is the dominant culture of Thailand?
Thailand, its people and dominant culture. Understanding the dominant culture
of Thailand may shed some light on why the TRC’s did not use the Sphere Project (2004)
of minimum standards for disaster response or follow the Code of Conduct in its response
efforts. Culturally and historically, Buddhism is the dominant religion in Thailand. The
main premise of Buddhism is to overcome suffering in an attempt to elevate ones
spiritual self to a state of enlightenment, meaning “deep insight into the ultimate
mysteries of life” (Melkote & Steeves, 2001, p. 288). Buddha also taught “Four Noble
Truths” related to life and suffering, the detriment of pernicious human desires,
overcoming suffering by ridding one’s life of human desires, and living in the right path
that can leads to enlightenment. Additionally, the qualities of heart required for one to
achieve enlightenment are loving kindness, compassion for others, joy in others’
happiness, and composure under pressure (Melkote & Steeves, 2001).
The central concern of Buddhism is compassion for all (Melkote & Steeves,
2001). The Thai people are particularly known for their gentleness, live-and-let-live
attitudes, and pure compassion for all forms of life. This was exceptionally evident, after
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the tsunami, when Thai nationals from around the country reached out to help and serve
in whatever capacity they were able. Many Thais from around the country provided both
small and grand acts of compassion for thousands of victims. Stories that tourist
survivors shared were compelling and heartwarming as they spoke of the many acts of
kindness offered to them by those who could not even speak their language. A truly
humanitarian spirit is alive and well in Thailand. But this is the culture of the Thai
people: a culture of genuine care and service.
In summary for the culture of Buddhism, suffering is a mandatory element for a
person to reach the ultimate spiritual level of enlightenment. Enlightenment may be
achieved through living a simple life, suppressing all human desires and providing
service to others in need. There were many Thais suffering in body and spirit after the
tsunami, and this suffering, along with giving service to others, may have been viewed as
progression to enlightenment. Conversely, the act of requesting help or even desiring
help for one’s self may have been completely taboo for faithful Buddhist seeking that
ultimate spiritual state of enlightenment.
An elderly Thai gentleman patiently introduced one aspect of the culture in
describing how one never wants to be above other people because equality is maintained
amongst everyone. To desire extra knowledge or an additional measured portion is not
the way of the Thai people. Whatever is received is shared with all. The elderly are
respected not only for their age and life experiences, but also for the knowledge and
wisdom they share with younger generations. Thais are humble and take great pride in
living by this law of equality.
This concept of equality and service is engrained so deeply within the Thai people
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that public humiliation or shame will be avoided at great costs. Shame, for example,
could be brought upon a person by the human desire of greed. Therefore, honesty is a
highly favored personal virtue.
Here are two personal examples of this honesty and shame interaction. While
motorcycle riding with a Thai friend, I noticed a wallet in the middle of a road. Being in
the country with very few farmers and even less traffic on the dirt road, I nudged my
friend and told him to stop. Sympathetic towards the individual missing their wallet, I
explained about the wallet and asked what we should do. He quickly responded, “It’s not
mine.” And started back down the road.
A young mother who lost all earthy possessions during the tsunami was employed
to learn the art of jewelry making and make pearl jewelry for export. One day she came
to work with a new pair of beautiful pearl earrings. The pearls were very unique and
exactly the same as the pearls at work. When questioned about the earrings she stated
she bought them in a shop, but upon further questioning she admitted to taking the pearls
home and making the earrings for herself. The earrings were returned and she was given
a second chance to earn back the trust she had lost by stealing. Shamed and publicly
humiliated for her dishonesty, this young mother (who is also the most talented worker
within the group) will not return to work. Repeated petitions for her return are answered
with, “I am shamed, I am shamed.”
These two examples illustrate outcomes of saving face in Thai culture. The first
example illustrates how actions governed by honesty allow a Thai to live without shame
or fear of retribution. The second example illustrates the extent to which shame can
produce severe self-inflicted social and financial wounds.
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Although the TRC stated that individuals had to come to them to receive help,
many devout Buddhists might quietly endure the suffering and not request specific help
for themselves in a dual attempt to reach enlightenment and avoid the appearance of
greed that might lead to public shame.
Political Implications
Variables related to culture and political implications found within the TRC
disaster response organization affected the process of response to the tsunami. Although
the officials at the TRC stated that they are independent from government organizations
and other NGO’s, the prime minister is actually responsible for disaster relief throughout
Thailand. The disaster relief efforts are under the direction of the minister of interior and
carried out by the Thai military. As stated in the report of the National Workshop (2005),
“The Royal Thai Armed Forces and other Ministries are brought into response framework
through the National Defense Council. The Thai Red Cross is integrated into response at
provincial level” (p. 2). Additional disaster response organizations are incorporated into
the disaster management response efforts as coordinated by the Thai Ministry of Interior
(2005). (See Appendix E).
The National Workshop (2005) conference that was held in Bangkok on May 3031, 2005, involved all of the major players of the disaster response effort including the
minister of the interior, military personal, United Nations officials and other nongovernment humanitarian organizations. The TRC was represented by Dr. Amnat Barlee,
director of the Community Health and Disaster Prevention Bureau. Another point worth
mentioning is the disaster response operations center was located within the TRC
Headquarters, 2nd floor, in conjunction with the Community Health and Disaster
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Prevention Bureau. Such close correlation shows that the TRC is not independent of the
government in Thailand. Therefore although the TRC had the Sphere Project training,
they had to wait for the government officials to tell them what to do and when to do it.
The ICRC recognizes the importance of national societies maintaining good and
open relationships with their governments. According to Davey and Blondel (1999), of
the ICRC, National Societies are sometimes required to disregard the humanitarian
principles upon which the society was founded in order to maintain a relationship with
the government and keep humanitarian channels open within their country. It seems this
might be the political case between the TRC and the government of Thailand.
Although not stated by the TRC, analysis of the political and cultural context in
which the TRC was working shows there was organizational conflict during the disaster
response. Political and cultural impediments inhibited the TRC in their ability to provide
effective disaster relief and therefore placed TRC administrators in an uncomfortable
position when it came time to answer research questions. First, the TRC was required to
follow the direction of the Minister of Interior and other governmental leaders in the
response efforts. This negated the responsibility the TRC had in initiating appropriate
and effective disaster response efforts that had been taught during the Sphere (2004)
training, in 2002. Second, the save-face and avoid shame culture initially prevented TRC
administrators, at provincial and national levels, from openly answering research
questions. Silence and avoidance provided an outlet to diffuse the questioning. Gentle
persistent persuasion led minimal information from administration officials; however, an
official TRC disaster communication policy was obtained. As the TRC is “owned by the
King” (Tasana, personal communication August 1, 2005; Thai Red Cross, At a Glance,

Disaster Communication Networks 103
n.d.) any criticism of the TRC disaster response efforts may be perceived as criticism of
the King of Thailand. Criticism of the royal family would produce the greatest shame of
all.
Financial and Economic Constraints
The Thai government response to the tsunami was highly influenced by the
economic history of the country. In 1997-98 there was a financial crisis in Asia, and
Thailand was hit hard by recession and economic woes (Haggard, 2000). Thailand’s
economy had recovered sufficiently by December 26, 2004, but fear of another financial
crisis was foremost on the minds of Thai citizens.
The Prime Minister continually tried to allay these fears in public broadcasts
stating that all of the reconstruction and response efforts would be handled by the
government, and also that the government had enough money within its reserves to
handle the entire response efforts (Suttinan, G., personal communication, February 1,
2006; Pinky, personal communication, February 12, 2006). It is also documented in the
government reports that “no outside help was requested” (National Workshop, 2005, p.
1). The Prime Minister’s efforts to allay fears in telling the Thai citizens that all disaster
response could and would be handled nationally, may have influence the TRC’s abilities
and resources for disaster response.
Here again the save face and avoid shame culture becomes apparent. It seems the
government was trying to handle all disaster response on its own, both physically and
financially, and to save face among its citizens. The TRC on the other hand, would save
face with government and military officials by respecting their authority and working
within the guidelines they provided to the TRC.
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Each of the listed impediments affected the TRC disaster response efforts in some
way. These inhibiting factors can be addressed and analyzed from several perspectives.
Additionally, each impediment can be dissected and analyzed by different academis
disciplines. For instance, the “developed world bias” noted in the Code of Conduct
(Hilhorst, 2005) can be addressed by international development scholars. Cultural,
political, and financial concerns can be addressed equivalently by sociologists, political
scientists and economists. A multi-discipline approach to disaster response will produce
the greatest benefit for mitigating the effects of such tragedies as the Indian Ocean
tsunami.
A Little Initiative and a Whole Lot of Colonel Chinnarat Rattanajikasem
Although Colonel Chinnarat Rattanajikasem entered the disaster scene in Phang
Nga Province devoid of the same disaster management training offered to TRC officials,
his actions exemplified the truest implementation of the Sphere Project (2004) minimum
standards of disaster response. The Colonel has a diverse and broad background as a
doctor, lawyer, psychologist, social worker, scientist, financial consultant, member of
parliament and military man (personal communication, July 9, 2005).
The Colonel arrived in Khao Lak to spray decaying bodies with a biological agent
to reduce the horrific smell. When he saw the needs of the people, and the lack of
assistance provided to them, he took action. His background in multiple disciplines
allowed him to use all of his professional experience in law, medicine, psychology,
finances and civil service to assess individual and community needs and then request help
from TRC headquarters.

Disaster Communication Networks 105
Within days of the tsunami Colonel Chinnarat created Front Line and organized
disaster response volunteers. The volunteers used grassroots methods to gather
information about the tsunami victims. They did this by going into villages and
communities, by talking directly with the people affected by the tsunami, and assessing
the actual situational needs of the people. The Colonel worked tirelessly along side the
volunteers and with the people. Because of these information-gathering techniques,
requests for assistance were based on the actual assessed needs of the people. These
actions alone meet the first three minimum standard of disaster response: participation,
initial assessment, response based on assessed needs (See Appendix G).
Front Line was finally incorporated into the TRC one month after the tsunami. In
July, 2005, Colonel Chinnarat and his assistant Choo were still in the villages, working
with the people and empowering them to solve their own problems. Their efforts seemed
effective with lasting and sustainable results. Why did the Colonel’s system work? What
can the world learn from Colonel Chinnarat Rattanajikasem’s example of disaster
response?
By utilizing his wealth of knowledge and skill and taking initiative for the benefit
of others the Colonel was an effective disaster responder. He could have
compartmentalized his responsibility as a scientist by spraying the decaying bodies with
the chemical agent and then leaving the disaster affected area when the assignment was
completed. But he branched out of his given scientific responsibility and into additional
disciplines of which he had knowledge and skill; in turn the effects of the disaster were
lessened on the lives and livelihoods of the immediately affected victims of the tsunami.

Disaster Communication Networks 106
For these efforts the people of Phang Nga Province, along with the world community,
should offer their thanks.
Colonel Chinnarat was uninhibited by the disaster response hierarchy of authority.
This may be because he held a bit of authority himself; however, he took initiative to find
ways to help those in need. The Colonel and Choo were proactive in their response
efforts. Not only did they go directly to the people to ask questions and but they took
their findings directly to those who could provide the needed assistance.
The Colonel’s formula for problem solving exhibits his initiative and uninhibited
nature. (Refer to Findings Chapter, pages 75-76). The Colonel was not and is not
inhibited by cultural or political barriers during disaster response. According to both the
Colonel and Choo, communication is key to effective disaster relief (personal
communication, July 9, 2005). Communication in Thailand can be impeded by saving
face avoidance tactics. Fast and efficient communication is a main focus of the Colonel’s
problem solving formula, therefore, there is no room within disaster response efforts to
be impeded by these cultural or political barriers of communication. The get-it-done-now
demeanor of the Colonel requires that communication lines between responders, victims,
governments, donors and other humanitarian organizations be open and working
efficiently for effective disaster response. The Colonel does not neglect the culture nor
the language of the people, but he promotes the positive qualities of transparency in his
formula.
As we examine the Colonel’s disaster response efforts, we see from his example
what worked for the people. The Colonel’s greatest contribution was not only to the
Asian tsunami victims, but also to future disaster victims throughout the world. By
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assessing what worked to mitigate the effects of this mega-disaster, the development of
disaster communication theory can commence. This theory should drive policy that will
affect the actions of government agencies and NGHOs concerning disaster response
initiatives.
Disaster Communication Theory
The paramount finding of this research is that disaster communication theory is
missing from academia and should be developed in the research literature. This research
found that within the discipline of mass communications, disaster communications is
heavily slanted toward public relations issues of image control and also the diffusion of
news. Speaking about emergency communication related to health issues, Snyder and
Cistulli (2005) verified this finding by stating, “…crisis communication is more often
patterned after current public relations practices than chronic communication campaign
practices” (p. 299).
Although disaster communications has not been generally embraced in the
academic field of communications, it has been addressed in policy management circles.
This evidence is readily available with a brief review of the listed references. Most of the
documents referring to disaster communication come from government agencies and
NGOs known in the sphere of development.
Since the Asian tsunami, of 2004, and Hurricane Katrina, of 2005, there has been
an international appeal for improved disaster communication specifically focused on
communication measures targeted at the immediate affected disaster victims (Morley,
2005; Select Bipartisan Committee, 2006; Sondorp & Bornemisza, 2005). Morley (2005)
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noted that public relations professionals have started to notice their inadequacy in this
aspect of disaster response.
Natural and man-made disasters are multi-dimensional and complex (Noji, 2005a;
Schiavo, 2005). While general public relations practices are necessary to disseminate
information and news of the event to concerned national and international audiences, of
greater importance is the mitigation of the disaster effects on the most vulnerable
populations: the immediately affected victims of the disaster. Mitigating the effects of
the disaster on this population can be accomplished through appropriate disaster
communication practice.
Because disasters are multi-dimensional, a multi-faceted approach must be used
to develop disaster communication theory. Utilizing theories and methods from multiple
disciplines in the creation of disaster communication theory can provide disaster
management professionals with an efficient, flexible, and effective tool for disaster
response. Colonel Chinnarat, who took this kind of multi-dimensional approach in his
disaster response efforts, utilized his knowledge and skill from a plethora of disciplines
and was found to be exceptionally effective in helping disaster victims.
One discipline that uses multiple methods and theories to reach a desired outcome
is the discipline of medicine. Schiavo (2005) noted that health communications utilizes
multiple methods and theories from many disciplines to accomplish the desired health
outcome. Health communications provides a good pattern for the development of
disaster communication theory because it focuses all aspects of theory and methods on
producing a health benefit to an individual.
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Disasters threaten life, health and livelihood of the immediately affected people.
Consequently, the focal point of disaster communications theory must be on the disaster
victim and identifying ways to diminish the affects of the disaster upon them. Although
each identified discipline could create their own discipline-specific theory of disaster
communications (for example, the focus on public relations, corporate image protection,
diffusion of news and fundraising efforts within the discipline of communications), the
axis upon which disaster communication theory turns must be the point of convergence
of all disciplines on the topic of mitigating the effects of the disaster on the immediately
affected victims.
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), from the discipline of public management,
might be a beneficial starting point to identify other disciplines from which to draw
theory and method for disaster communication theory. Stakeholder theory says to
identify every audience that has a stake in the outcome or findings. The victims have one
of the greatest stakes in a disaster event because it is their life and health at stake.
The World Bank (1996) has produced a Participation Sourcebook that focuses on
stakeholder participation in economic and social development. This is a good resource to
review and draw information on the importance of empowering the affected population
and other stakeholders in disaster response efforts. Principles and practices from the
discipline of development, such as diffusion and participatory communication, will add to
disaster communication theory. Moreover, identification of additional stakeholders in
disaster communication theory will produce additional disciplines to be consulted and
draw expertise.
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The development of disaster communication theory is long overdue. Progress
toward a theory of disaster communication will require a multi-dimensional approach and
trans-disciplinarian cooperation. Combining the best theory, methods and practice from
multiple disciplines provides a cumulative source from which to develop a phenomenal
disaster communication theory. It is time to break out of our compartmentalized
disciplines, use some imagination, and take the initiative to do something of great
importance that can positively affect the world. This is a petition for all communication
scholars, from all scholastic disciplines, to work together for the benefit of current and
future disaster victims. It is time to move forward in this area of communication theory.
Conclusions and Personal Observations
In conclusion, I want to share a few thoughts on points of interests that evolved
and also offer a few suggestions on how to improve disaster communication networks
and disaster response for future disasters. I will first introduce the topic of power/control
struggles and how this interacts with the principle of empowerment. I will then speak
about communication breakdown following a disaster and share examples of TRC
communication breakdown after the tsunami. I will then introduce the principle of victim
participation for effective disaster mitigation and response efforts, and also share
examples from Colonel Chinnarat’s efforts. And lastly, I will propose a model for
effective disaster communication offer a few points on how the TRC can improve their
disaster communication network in preparation for future disasters.
Empowerment
In my opinion, the empowerment of villagers in the tsunami-affected zone of
Phang Nga Province, Thailand, is one of the greatest highlights of Colonel Chinnarat’s
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disaster management efforts. This empowerment came as Colonel Chinnarat affirmed to
the victims that it was okay and acceptable for them, as enlightenment-seeking Buddhists,
to ask for help following the tsunami.
The notion of empowerment (individual, organizational or community) has been
recognized as the gaining of control over resources, democratic and political processes,
and social and economic conditions (Melkote, 2000). However, empowerment of Thai
nationals and disaster-affected communities was not solely based on the attainment of
control over resources, social conditions, economic conditions or political processes.
Rather, individual and community empowerment, following the tsunami, evolved with
the sharing of knowledge: knowledge of legal rights, knowledge of how to ask
government agencies for assistance, and knowledge about who to approach for help.
From this example I have come to believe that empowerment is not an all or
nothing issue of control over resources, society, politics or the economy, but that
empowerment can be attained in very small increments of progress. I call these steps of
progress: increments of empowerment. Information, knowledge and education are basic
increments of empowerment. This case study shows that the sharing of information
actually liberated Thai nationals from their own cultural inhibitions and empowered them
in their personal decision-making processes.
Communication Breakdown
The sharing of information or diffusion of information, to the immediatelyaffected victims of a disaster, from reliable sources, such as trusted government officials
and NGHOs, is imperative for effective disaster communication. Effective disaster
communication leads to knowledge and knowledge leads to efficient action of both
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victims and the responding agencies. This diffusion of news and exchange of
information must be transmitted through any means of interpersonal or mediated
communication methods, such as written text, audio, and visual messages, to reach the
greatest number of immediately-affected disaster victims. Every attempt should be made
to provide the disaster victims with accurate and timely information. Information must
be diffused in the appropriate languages of all identifiable disaster victims.
Communication breakdown arises when information is not gathered or shared
with appropriate groups or individuals. Communication breakdown during disasters has
been increasingly evident. Jeong (1996) reported that this breakdown is generally
organizationally dependent because various responding organizations have “differing
perceptions of information requirements for various functions” and that “these differing
priorities often lead to overestimated or underestimated damage assessments being
delivered within and among organizations” (p. 15).
Jeong’s (1996) findings are validated from this current research looking at the
TRC’s communication response to the Indian Ocean tsunami. Theoretically the TRC is
independent from the government of Thailand. However, disaster management
throughout the country is overseen by the Prime Minister and carried out by the Minister
of Interior and the Royal Thai Military. Therefore, political constraints led to the
communication breakdown within the TRC and between responding government
agencies. Because of these constraints, Provincial TRC President, Tasana
Metheevibulvut, had not the authority or resources to work outside the government’s
disaster management realm.
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Not only was there a communication breakdown in the TRC line of disaster
response, but also within government agencies responsible to help disaster victims. Choo
of Front Line noted that corruption in the response effort crept into disaster response as
the sharing of knowledge and information was hedged between responsible government
agencies and affected communities (personal communication, May 27, 2005).
Government officials who had the ability and knowledge to help those in need, following
the disaster, did not share their knowledge of available services with those in need;
therefore, various services were not being utilized by the victims. Ultimately, what Choo
was saying was that information is power; whoever has the information has the power,
and those who withheld information and services, meant for the people, are corrupt
(personal communication, May 27, 2005). After Front Line was integrated into the TRC,
the Colonel and Choo worked with the people in the villages and the government
agencies to remove these communication barriers (personal communication, May 27,
2005, and July 9, 2005).
Participation
The TRC did not follow the Sphere Project’s (2004) minimal standard of
participation, meaning the participation of those affected by the disaster, in their disaster
response efforts. Unfortunately, the chaos of trying to find logistical solutions to
unnecessary and inappropriate donations overburdened TRC officials (National
Workshop, 2005) and became a great distraction from the more pressing issues of disaster
management and response. This problem might have been easily remedied or prevented
if the Thai government department of disaster management and mitigation would have
utilized the Sphere Project (2004) minimal standards for disaster response in its efforts.
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The missing link in all disaster communication is the voice and participation of
the victims in disaster assessments and disaster response efforts. Disaster victims must
be consulted and engaged in the disaster response efforts regardless of power struggles
within responding organizations or even within different segments of the affected
population. Those immediately affected by a disaster are the most knowledgeable of
their own resources and needs following the disaster, therefore, effective disaster
communication should incorporate participation of those immediately affected by the
disaster.
Individual and community needs assessments must be based first on preservation
of life, and second on the preservation of livelihood. All cultural, minority and
segmented groups within any particular community should be represented in the overall
assessment; information gleaned from these diverse representatives adds legitimacy and
accuracy to community disaster assessments. The knowledge gained from these thorough
assessments will guide more efficient and effective response efforts. The needs
assessments of effected communities, verified by responding agencies, should be utilized
to coordinate and orchestrate disaster response efforts.
A Proposed Model for Disaster Communication
The Colonel’s disaster response efforts provide us with a multi-faceted study of
victim empowerment, victim participation and effective disaster communication
networking. Even though the Colonel’s efforts were directed only toward Thai-national
communities, the example he provides can be transferred to other minority or segmented
groups involved in disasters.
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Colonel Chinnarat served as a mentor to villagers. He gathered information and
assessed the disaster situation within communities by physically walking through the
damaged areas and talking to individuals. The Colonel freely shared his knowledge by
working directly with the people hit by the tsunami. The people trusted Colonel
Chinnarat and respected his opinion and his counsel. As the Colonel shared his
knowledge and worked side by the side the people, the people were educated and then
empowered to work through their own problems using the government resources
available to them.
Colonel Chinnarat served as a liaison between the disaster-affected people and the
disaster response head office of the TRC, in Bangkok. As both a mentor to the people
and a liaison between communities and government agencies, the Colonel was able to
help villages become organized in their own disaster response efforts. The disaster
communication model proposed here revolves around the principles of individual and
community empowerment, participation and organization.
Effective disaster communication must originate or focus on the people at the
point of disaster impact. Disaster victims to whom this disaster communication model
targets are those who are most vulnerable to lose their life, health or livelihood due to the
natural or man-made disaster. Disaster communications must target the victims of
disasters as the point where vital information is exchanged.
The exchange of information between victims and responding agencies leads to
knowledge. Knowledge transformed into positive self-directed action is an increment of
empowerment. Communities that are educated about disasters and how to respond or
react during a disaster can be empowered to take a proactive stance in disaster
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management and mitigation. Empowered individuals and communities participate in
finding solutions to their own problems. The participation of many leads to a system of
organization.
A community-based model of emergency preparedness and disaster response
would be highly beneficial to communities throughout the world, especially communities
within developing nations. A volunteer emergency preparedness model connected with
either government emergency response agencies or NGHO emergency response groups
could provide developing nation communities with good emergency preparedness and
response options. The basis of such community programs would be to enable and
empower communities in their own disaster response efforts. Front Line’s grass roots
disaster response model, championed by Colonel Chinnarat, proved effective within the
communities it served. Front Line was effective because it opened communication
channels that led to a gradual empowerment of disaster-affected people and communities.
My proposed disaster communication network or model starts with a core group
of community-based volunteers. These individuals should receive emergency
preparedness and response training from appropriate disaster management groups. The
community volunteers would, in turn, propagate emergency preparedness and disaster
response training throughout their individual villages and communities, empowering
individuals and guiding the organization of community-based emergency preparedness
and response groups.
The core group of community volunteers could serve as information liaisons
between responding organizations and the affected community. Following a disaster, the
communication points within affected communities would be these trained volunteers.
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As disaster communication liaisons, the volunteers would provide the stakeholders of
both the disaster-affected community and the responding agency with accurate and timely
information, mediating the assessment of needs and resources.
These liaisons would serve a very important role in disaster management because,
not only would they have an understanding of the communities, cultures and customs, but
they would also be a resource for distributing information to disaster-affected individuals.
Colonel Chinnarat commented on the abilities of a liaison stating, “A person in this
position must have a varied background in many different fields, they must understand
the people and the customs and the way things work. They must speak the language of
the people”(personal communication, July 9, 2005). They must speak not only the verbal
language of the people, but the body language and cultural language of the people as
well. Colonel Chinnarat was an exemplar of these abilities.
Community-based emergency response programs initiated by governments or
NGHOs, in communities throughout the world, and specifically within developing
nations, can be modified to accommodate the social, political, cultural and health
circumstances of targeted audiences. Effective disaster communication must incorporate
aspects of both development communication and health communication practices.
Haider and Pal (2005) noted that the future of health communications is to tailor
communication strategies to target different audiences according to their “social,
political, economic, environmental and health circumstances” (p. 421). Thoughtful
innovations and supportive organizations influence healthy behavior. Haider and Pal
(2005) explain the necessity of creating communication strategies that target individuals
according to their life situations. They stated:
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Focused innovations and organizations play key roles in targeting behavioral
contributors to health promotion and disease prevention. Innovations that are
tailored to suit specific audiences segments and are marketed through proper
media channels have a greater likelihood of being adopted by individuals and
groups. Organizations that aim specifically to foster behavior change through
health communications can concentrate their efforts on identified needs of the
consumer as part of a consumer-oriented paradigm. (Haider & Pal, 2005, p. 421)
How is this related to disaster communications? Disaster victims become resource
consumers; therefore, engagement of individuals in disaster preparedness plans and
efficient emergency response training is a healthy behavior that may mitigate the negative
effects of a disaster on life and livelihood.
As stated previously, health communications provides a good basis for initiating
disaster communications because it utilizes multiple disciplines, theories and methods to
achieve the desired outcomes. The positive consumer-oriented behaviors associated with
disaster preparation and emergency response might be: maintaining a small storage of
food and water, having a first aid kit, participating in disaster drills, and knowing escape
routes. Targeting negative consumer-oriented behaviors with disaster communications
strategies will require a multi-faceted approach to initiate and organize community
emergency preparedness and response programs. The creation of this network must
utilize “several theoretical frameworks and disciplines, including but not limited to health
education, social marketing, behavioural and social change theories” (Schiavo, 2005, ¶ 5)
to protect the lives and health of those who are the actual and immediate victims of
natural and man-made disasters.
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Each community in which a disaster communication network is to be established
will be different from the next. I believe that the use of Colonel Chinnarat’s versatile
formula for solving problems (IT3C4—I=Information; T3=Technology, Terrain, Time;
C4=Coordination, Communication, Command, Control) would address a significant
portion of different community variables and situational issues. The core group of
knowledgeable volunteers (also know as the disaster communications liaisons) can use
this formula to address community issues as they go through the process of educating,
empowering, and involving community members in emergency preparedness and disaster
response training. The ultimate goal of this disaster training and community participation
would be the organization of community-based emergency preparedness and response
groups who have an open line of communication with disaster management government
agencies or NGHOs. The creation of these disaster communications networks will
require collaboration from varying disciplines, the use of multiple strategies and different
combinations of approaches, and I believe it can be accomplished. Colonel Chinnarat’s
formula for solving problems combined with a community volunteer-based emergency
preparedness and response program could significantly improve disaster communication
networks world-wide.
The TRC would do well to initiate this model of community-based disaster
preparedness and response training and inform communities about the services they offer.
Although the TRC could not fulfill the minimum standards of disaster response, because
of its political affiliation with the Thai Government, Thais and foreigners alike were
moved to respond with a great wave of compassion for all humanity.
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Humanity is alive and well in Thailand. Others came to the rescue of their fellow
men and women. Locals, nationals and foreigners reached beyond themselves and their
families to help those in distress, despair and need. Time and time again I listened to
stories of that fateful day in December. Each survivor’s story was unique. However a
common thread of humanity and compassion is woven throughout—Citizens opening
their homes, kitchens and pantries to the destitute; there were heroic acts of rescues and
unselfish care for the wounded. Compassion emerged from the chaos and humanity
generally prevailed over the horrors of the disaster.
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Appendix A
Seven Founding Principles of the Red Cross
The seven founding principles of the Red Cross are:
1) Humanity: To prevent and alleviate human suffering without discrimination.
2) Impartiality: To relieve suffering of individuals with no discrimination as to
nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. Actions are
guided solely by the needs, and giving priority to the most urgent cases of
distress.
3) Neutrality: The movement may not take sides in hostilities or controversies
of political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
4) Independence: The movement is independent. National societies must
always maintain their autonomy so that they may be able to, at all times, act in
accordance with the principles of the Movement.
5) Volunteer Service: This is a voluntary relief Movement not prompted in any
manner for gain.
6) Unity: There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent society in any one
country, which must be open to all and carry its work throughout the entire
territory.
7) Universality: The Movement of the Red Cross is worldwide and all Societies
have equal status and share equal responsibilities in helping each other. (The
Thai Red Cross Society: at a Glance (n.d.)
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Appendix B
Historical Highlights of the Thai Red Cross
According to the Thai Red Cross (n.d.), these are major highlights of its
organization:
1893. Founding of the Red Unalom Society of Siam.
1895. Thailand acceded to the Geneva Convention.
1906. The name “Red Unalom Society” was changed to “Siamese (Thai)
Red Cross Society.”
1920. The TRC was officially recognized by the International Committee of the
Red Cross.
1921. The TRC was accepted as a member of the League of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies.
1962. Establishment of the TRC Provincial Chapters throughout the country.
Today the TRC constitutes a major network of health care and relief services. It is by far,
the largest humanitarian organization in the country. (The Thai Red Cross Society: At a
Glance, pg 4-5).
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Appendix C

Obtained from http://www.redcross.or.th/english/aboutus/organizationchart.php4
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Appendix D
The Mission of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center

The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) is a non-profit organization
supporting the advancement of safer communities and sustainable development, through
implementing programs and projects that reduce the impact of disasters upon countries
and communities in Asia and the Pacific, by:
•

developing and enhancing sustainable institutional disaster risk management
capacities, frameworks and mechanisms, and supporting the development and
implementation of government policies;

•

facilitating the dissemination and exchange of disaster risk management expertise,
experience and information; and

•

raising awareness and enhancing disaster risk management knowledge and skills.

Information obtained November 15, 2005, from http://www.adpc.net/
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Appendix E
Thailand Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation

Disaster management system obtained from http://www.disaster.go.th/html/english/
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Appendix F
International Committee of the Red Cross Plan of Action, 1999:
Resolutions and Final Goals
The following is the Plan of Action from the 27th International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent, held in Geneva, Switzerland, 1999. The three resolutions
and final goals became the plan of action from 2000 to 2003 for all members of the
Movement. A follow-up on theses resolutions and final goals was given at the 28th
International Conference the later part of 2003.

Plan of Action for the years 2000-2003
Annex 2 of the resolution 1--The members of the 27th International Conference of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent, held in Geneva from 31 October to 6 November 1999,
adopt the following Plan of Action for the coming four years in order to improve the care
and protection of victims of armed conflicts and disasters and more generally of the most
vulnerable people. They will implement the actions set out in the Plan of Action in
accordance with their respective powers, mandates and capacities.
In adopting this
Plan of Action, the International Conference recognises the unique nature of the cooperation between the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement [1] and
States [2] and the specific mandates of each component of the Movement. It also
reaffirms the commitment of States, adhering to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations Charter, to meet their existing obligations under international humanitarian law
to support the work of each component of the Movement and to respect at all times the
components' adherence to the Fundamental Principles.
The Plan of Action is divided
into long term goals and specific actions which represent the main areas where a renewed
effort is required from States and the Movement for their respective commitments in the
coming four years. [3]
The 28th International Conference will evaluate the results
attained over the next four years. The Standing Commission of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent will encourage and further the implementation of the Plan of Action, according
to its statutory mandate, through consultations with States party to the Geneva
Conventions, components of the Movement and other actors, as to the best methods of
achieving this.
1. Protection of victims of armed conflict through respect of international
humanitarian law
Final goals
1.1 Full compliance by all the parties to an armed conflict with their obligations under
international humanitarian law to protect and assist the civilian population and other
victims of the conflict and to respect protected objects
1.2 An effective barrier against impunity through the combination of relevant
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international treaties and national laws concerning the repression of violations of
international humanitarian law, and the examination of an equitable system of reparations
1.3 Universal acceptance of international humanitarian law and the adoption of all
necessary measures by States at the national level to ensure the implementation of their
obligations under international law
1.4 Integration, by States, of their obligations under international humanitarian law in
relevant procedures and training. Promotion of this law among relevant persons and
bodies
1.5 Conformity of weapons with international humanitarian law, the establishment of
effective controls on the availability of arms and ammunition, and an end to the human
tragedy caused by anti-personnel landmines
Actions proposed
2. Humanitarian action in times of armed conflict and other disasters
Final goals
2.1. Effective response in disaster situations through improved national and
international preparedness
2.2. Strengthened mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination amongst States, the
Movement and other humanitarian actors
2.3. Provision for the rights and acute needs of the most vulnerable people as the first
priority for humanitarian action
2.4. Understanding of the respective roles of political, military and humanitarian actors,
and protection of humanitarian personnel
Actions proposed
Final goal 2.1 - Effective response in disaster situations through improved national and
international preparedness
1. States will:
(a) establish or update national disaster preparedness plans which incorporate linkages,
where necessary, to international systems of disaster response and have clearly defined
and agreed roles and responsibilities for National Societies, including representation on
appropriate national policy and co-ordination bodies;
(b) examine the vulnerability of their disaster response systems to disaster damage and
take steps to ensure that these systems can continue to operate effectively in responding
to the needs created by disasters;
(c) help, as appropriate, National Societies, in co-operation with the International
Federation, to access and benefit from international funding within the multilateral
context, with a view to strengthening disaster preparedness.
2. National Societies, supported by their respective governments, the International
Federation and the ICRC, will:
(a) strengthen their disaster preparedness and response capacities, including the raising of
community awareness and support, both nationally and internationally, in response to
changing patterns of risk and vulnerability, and through lessons learned from experience
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gained over the past decade, including those within the framework of the International
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR);
(b) examine the vulnerability of their disaster response systems to disaster damage and
take steps to ensure that these systems can continue to operate effectively in responding
to the needs created by disasters.
3. The International Federation, while drawing upon existing research and the
competence of relevant international bodies, will undertake a study to assess the future
impact of climatic changes upon the frequency and severity of disasters and the
implications for humanitarian response and preparedness.
Final goal 2.2 - Strengthened mechanisms of co-operation and co-ordination amongst
States, the Movement and other humanitarian actors
4. The Movement, supported where appropriate by States, undertakes to improve cooperation and co-ordination in its international activities, both internally as set out in the
1997 Seville Agreement, and with States, the United Nations system, regional, national
and sub-national authorities, international organisations and other actors, based upon the
“Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NonGovernmental Organisations in Disaster Relief”.
5. States and the Movement will support efforts to develop minimum practical standards
for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, such as those elaborated in the Sphere
project (Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response).
6. The Movement will develop its activities in post-conflict situations. In particular, the
International Federation will develop its strategy to guide post-conflict relief and
rehabilitation programming based on National Societies' capacity for social mobilisation
and service provision. States and the Movement will promote better co-ordination
between States, international organisations, the Movement, NGOs and other
organisations in managing the transition from emergency humanitarian assistance to
longer term development assistance.
7. States and the Movement will co-operate to further develop:
(a) response mechanisms that are, above all, rapid, flexible and effective in responding to
needs of victims and vulnerable people;
(b) funding mechanisms that provide more predictable and appropriate funding while
recognising the accountability requirements of all parties.
Final goal 2.3 - Provision for the rights and acute needs of the most vulnerable people
as the first priority for humanitarian action
8. States and all parties to an armed conflict will take all necessary measures to ensure the
civilian character of refugee and internally displaced persons camps, and that appropriate
conditions are met regarding location, environment, camp security, law and order, and
registration. The Movement will offer its services, where required, in assisting to meet
these responsibilities.
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9. National Societies, the International Federation and the ICRC, according to their
respective mandates and in accordance with international humanitarian law, may offer
their services on behalf of refugees and asylum seekers in co-operation with UNHCR,
and, taking note of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, may also offer their
services on behalf of internally displaced persons, and will:
(a) extend support to States in fulfilling their obligations to assist and protect refugees,
asylum seekers and internally displaced persons;
(b) ensure that their programmes support host government efforts to seek durable
solutions for displaced populations, including voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity,
in dialogue with countries of origin;
(c) promote efforts to develop solidarity and understanding between host communities
and refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons.
10. States and the Movement encourage the United Nations Security Council, before
applying economic sanctions, to take into
account the needs of the civilian population and apply humanitarian exemptions, as
appropriate. States welcome the note by the President of the Security Council of 29
January 1999 on the work of the sanctions committees, in particular the paragraphs
relating to the humanitarian impact of sanctions.
Final goal 2.4 - Understanding of the respective roles of political, military and
humanitarian actors, and protection of humanitarian personnel
11. Political and military actors and humanitarian organisations, while acknowledging
and respecting the clear distinction between their different missions and modes of
operations, will undertake at the national and international levels to strengthen their
dialogue in order to ensure a clear understanding of, and respect for, each others'
mandates and roles.
12. Humanitarian personnel will be respected and protected at all times. Threats to, and
attacks on, such personnel will be duly investigated and those alleged to have committed
such attacks will be brought to justice under due process of law. In this context, States are
encouraged to consider becoming parties to the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel.
3. Strategic partnership to improve the lives of vulnerable people
Final goals
3.1 Improved health for vulnerable people based on strengthened co-operation between
States and National Societies
3.2 New initiatives to meet the needs of vulnerable people and to reduce discrimination
and violence in the community
3.3 Increased National Society capacities and effective partnership with States, and cooperation with relevant humanitarian and development organisations
Actions proposed
Final goal 3.1 - Improved health for vulnerable people based on strengthened co-
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operation between States and National Societies
1. States note the important role of National Societies in providing and advocating for
improved health and social services particularly for vulnerable groups, and will
strengthen their co-operation with their National Societies to further this end. States will
provide opportunities, where appropriate, for National Societies to be represented in
policy, planning and implementation bodies.
2. States, National Societies, and the International Federation, together with the
appropriate international and national bodies, will develop their collaboration to increase
promotion and provision of primary health care, with particular emphasis on preventative
primary health care and the well-being of vulnerable people in inaccessible and underserved areas, and in the most deprived sections of large cities.
3. States recognise that blood service provision as part of health care is the overall
responsibility of governments. National Societies will support national blood
programmes as needed through the provision of high quality and safe blood services
based upon voluntary, non-remunerated blood donation. To this end, States will strive to
ensure, where appropriate, that adequate resources are made available to National
Societies involved in such programmes.
4. The International Federation and National Societies will, in co-operation with States,
and appropriate national and international bodies, further strengthen their capacity to
prevent, treat and control communicable diseases (including emerging and re-emerging
diseases), especially tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases,
malaria and vaccine-preventable diseases.
5. States recognise the intrinsic value of first aid training for the public as an effective
means for prevention, preparedness and response to emergencies as well as day-to-day
health problems. Accordingly, States, where appropriate, will give consideration to
providing opportunities for first aid training for school children, public servants, health
professionals and members of the community, utilising in particular the expertise and
capacity of their National Societies.
6. States will respond to the growing global problem of road accidents through, for
example, the further development of road safety measures in collaboration with all
concerned partners, in particular National Societies. Concerned National Societies will
develop their role in support of first aid training and public awareness activities to reduce
levels of road accidents and the resulting casualties, especially amongst vulnerable
populations.
Final goal 3.2 - New initiatives to meet the needs of vulnerable people and to reduce
discrimination and violence in the community
7. The ICRC, the International Federation and National Societies, with the support of
States where applicable, will develop innovative ways to explain and communicate the
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, inside the Movement and
externally to local authorities and the community, as a means of:
(a) ensuring that all volunteers and staff of the Movement understand and act on the basis
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of the Fundamental Principles in their day-to-day work;
(b) ensuring that public authorities understand the role of the Movement, use its capacity
and facilitate its access to vulnerable people in peaceful and violent circumstances, in
accordance with applicable international law;
(c) developing mutual understanding and fostering initiatives in the community, taking
into account the diversity of its cultural, religious and other representative features, to
protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human being.
8. States, where appropriate, will facilitate access to schools and universities for National
Societies, the International Federation and the ICRC, and will contribute to the
development of communication and teaching materials which foster understanding of the
Fundamental Principles.
9. National Societies will review and adjust their service delivery and communication
programmes to ensure that they fully represent the application of the Fundamental
Principles, with particular reference to advocacy for, and services to, the most vulnerable
people in the community.
10. National Societies, in reviewing their programmes, will pay special attention to the
needs of children living in difficult circumstances, in particular street children. With the
support of the International Federation, they will develop their activities and advocacy,
where appropriate, to contribute to meeting these needs. States, where appropriate, will
draw on the capacities of National Societies, and support their actions in meeting the
needs of street children.
11. States will seek to improve the plight of children living in difficult circumstances by
meeting their special needs, with emphasis on prevention of sexual exploitation and
physical and other forms of abuse and the sale of children with the ultimate objective of
the reintegration of these children into their families and society. States will strive to
achieve the rapid conclusion of the work of the United Nations Working Group on an
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the Sale of Children,
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.
12. National Societies and States will co-operate and, as appropriate, take initiatives to
promote tolerance, non-violence in the community and respect for cultural diversity.
Final goal 3.3 - Increased National Society capacities and effective partnership with
States, and co-operation with relevant humanitarian and development organisations
13. States, recognising the auxiliary role of National Societies and the growing
significance of their work in the provision of services and the fostering of respect for the
human being, will:
(a) where necessary, commit to further strengthening the capacity of the National Society
of their own country, facilitating and supporting its role in response to new challenges in
the national context;
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(b) recognise the growing importance of volunteers as providers of practical and
emotional support to vulnerable people in the community, thus complementing the
coverage of needs not met by the formal service delivery system. States consequently
review, and where necessary, introduce or update legislation so as to facilitate the
efficient work of relevant voluntary organisations;
(c) increase their support for building a stronger, global National Society network, better
able to respond to needs in the community and to disasters. In this they will give due
recognition to the experience of the “Tripartite Process” launched by the International
Federation in follow-up to the 26th International Conference;
(d) as appropriate, increase their support for co-ordination between the National Society
network and relevant humanitarian and development organisations.
14. National Societies, in order to ensure their capacity to respond more effectively to
new challenges, will:
(a) take new initiatives to ensure a well-balanced participation by people from all sectors
of society in their organisation and programmes, and promote their integration into
National Society decision-making processes and leadership positions;
(b) review their legal base and statutes to determine whether they need to be updated. As
part of this process they will consider the draft model law prepared by the International
Federation and the ICRC, the guidelines for National Society statutes and other relevant
decisions of Movement and International Federation statutory bodies;
(c) commit themselves to increased co-ordination and co-operation with relevant
humanitarian and development organisations.
15. The International Federation will:
(a) continue its research, in co-operation with National Societies, on specific aspects of
voluntarism, in order to develop updated policy and guidelines;
(b) initiate, in co-operation with National Societies and the ICRC, an in-depth study into
the working relationship between States and National Societies, taking into account the
changing needs in the humanitarian, health and social fields, the auxiliary role of
National Societies and the evolving role of the State, the private sector and voluntary
organisations in service provision;
(c) implement “Strategy 2010”, adopted by its General Assembly in October 1999, which
seeks to build the individual and collective actions of National Societies, in co-operation
with States, in order to improve the lives of vulnerable people.
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Appendix G
The Sphere Project Common Standards of Disaster Response

The Sphere Project (2004) defines minimum and common standards of disaster
response for the entire disaster management and response communities. This community
includes all Red Cross components, governments and non-governmental humanitarian
agencies (NGHA). Under the Sphere handbook chapter entitled, “Common Standards for
All,” core ‘process and people’ standards are listed. Six of the eight standards relate
specifically to the Participatory Theory of Communications. The standards are:
1. Participation—disaster affected populations must be involve in decision making
through the project cycle (assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation). Information and knowledge sharing between all parties involved
allows for transparency and better coordination of response efforts.
2. Initial assessment—assessments are made concerning each aspect of a disaster
related to life, health, dignity and livelihoods. This assessment provides a basis
for immediate response from the organizations best suited to assist.
3. Response—the response should be organized on the basis of assessed needs.
4. Targeting—this standard is utilized to provide for the needs of the most
vulnerable while providing aid efficiently without causing dependency.
5. Monitoring—the disaster and response situations must be continually assessed for
changes. Monitoring is a standard that helps managers and affected populations
to determine priorities, identify trends or emerging problems, identify the
effectiveness of the response and to make changes as necessary. Information that
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is collected should be disseminated to the right audiences (both the response
sector and the disaster affected population) and acted on accordingly.
6. Evaluation—looking critically at the humanitarian response following a disaster
provides lessons that will enhance future efforts once they are addressed in policy
and utilized in practice.
7. Aid worker competencies and responsibilities—aid workers will possess
appropriate qualifications, attitudes and experience to plan and effectively
implement appropriate programmes. Workers should be familiar with human
rights and humanitarian principles and have an understanding of the local cultures
and customs.
8. Supervision, management and support of personnel—aid workers received
supervision and support. Humanitarian agencies should ensure that their staff are
qualified and competent, and properly trained and prepared, before assignment to
an emergency situation.
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Appendix H
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Disaster Preparedness
(1999) and Emergency Response (1997) Policies
Disaster preparedness policy, 1999
Introduction
The readiness to predict and, where possible, prevent disasters, reduce their impact as
well as respond to and cope with their consequences at international, national and local
levels is central to the work of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies and every individual National Society. This work, key to development,
essentially involves reducing the vulnerability of households and communities in
disaster-prone areas and improving their ability to cope with the effects of disasters;
strengthening the capacities of National Societies in disaster preparedness and postdisaster response; determining a National Society role and mandate in national disaster
plans; and establishing regional networks of National Societies that will strengthen the
Federation's collective impact in disaster preparedness and response at the international
level.
Scope
This policy establishes the basis of Red Cross and Red Crescent action in disaster
preparedness. It applies to all types of disaster preparedness activities at local, national,
regional and international levels whether carried out by a single branch of a National
Society, by an individual National Society or by the International Federation acting
together.
Statement
The International Federation and each individual National Society shall:
Recognize that disaster preparedness should be one of the primary activities of the
International Federation and each National Society, regarding it as the most effective
way of reducing the impact of both small and localized as well as large-scale disasters.
The National Society has a role to play at the branch, the national and the international
level. These roles shall be complemented by the actions of the Federation at the
international level.
Recognize disaster preparedness as an effective link between emergency response,
rehabilitation and development programmes and strive to build disaster preparedness
upon the competent programming in other key areas Red Cross/Red Crescent work such
as in the health sector.
Recognize the Red Cross/Red Crescent role in disaster preparedness as
complementary to government and thus will not replace state responsibilities. In
addition, the National Society should engage in debate with the government on the focus
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and nature of the National Emergency Plan and encourage the assignment of a clear role
and responsibilities to the National Society, supported by appropriate legislation.
Advocate, where necessary, with government, donors, non-governmental
organizations and the public, the need for and effectiveness of disaster
preparedness. National Societies should contribute to raising awareness of hazards,
levels of risks and coping mechanisms adopted by society and mitigation programmes,
such as early warning systems, that may reduce the loss of lives and property when a
disaster strikes.
Strengthen the organizational structures at international, national and local levels
required for effective disaster preparedness. In particular, prioritize the strengthening
of branches and the mobilization and training of Red Cross/Red Crescent volunteers in
high-risk areas and the responsibility of National Societies to prepared to be part of the
Federation's international disaster response programming. Integrate or harmonize such
activities with institutional development and other relevant programme areas.
Improve co-ordination by promoting better co-operation and partnerships between
National Societies, ICRC, governments, non-governmental organizations and other
disaster response agencies at local, national, regional and international levels.
Identify those persons, communities and households most at risk to disaster through
assessment and analysis of risks, vulnerabilities and capacities (Vulnerability and
Capacity Assessment) as a basis for prioritising location and focus of programming
activities.
Raise awareness of disaster hazards through public education, encouraging vulnerable
people to take preventative and mitigating actions where possible before disaster strikes.
Ensure that the knowledge from prediction and early warning systems can be accessed,
understood and acted upon by local communities
Improve the ability of vulnerable communities to cope with disasters through
community-based disaster preparedness strategies that build on existing structures,
practices, skills and coping mechanisms. Recognizing that a community-based approach
is the best guarantee that improvement in disaster preparedness will be realized and
sustained, the assisted population must participate in the planning and preparation for
disasters. All activities and programmes should be sensitive to issues of gender,
generation and the needs of vulnerable groups, such as the disabled.
Strive to provide the financial, material and human resources required to carry out
appropriate and sustainable disaster preparedness activities. In particular, maximize
the strategic advantage of the International Federation to mobilize all available resources
and establish regional networks of National Societies that will strengthen the Federation's
collective impact in disaster preparedness.

Disaster Communication Networks 149
Responsibilities
National Societies and the International Federation have a responsibility to ensure that all
disaster preparedness activities and programmes are carried out in compliance with this
policy; that all staff and volunteers participating in such programmes are aware of the
rationale and content of the policy; and that all relevant governmental, intergovernmental
and non-governmental partners are adequately informed of this policy.
Obtained from http://www.ifrc.org/who/policy/dppolicy.asp

Emergency response policy, 1997
Introduction
Emergencies can be on any scale, affecting a single household or a local community,
causing disruption at a national or even global level. Emergencies are defined as life
threatening situations which put people at risk of death or severe deterioration in their
health status or living conditions, and which have the potential to out-strip the normal
coping capacity of the individual, family, community and state support systems.
Emergencies may affect men and women differently, and they in turn have differing ways
of coping with emergencies.
The Red Cross and Red Crescent must be able to act in all these life threatening situations
regardless of the scope of the emergency, and its actions must be governed by the same
policy regardless of the size and level of the response.
Scope
This emergency response policy establishes the basis of Red Cross and Red Crescent
emergency response and applies to all types of International Federation emergency
response whether carried out by a single branch of a National Society, by an individual
National Society or by the International Federation acting collectively.
Statement
The International Federation and each individual National Society shall:
Seek to assist the most vulnerable people in emergencies. International Federation
Emergency Response seeks to protect the life and health of the individual and to ensure
respect for the individual through assisting those most affected in obtaining adequate
access to basic life support needs. These encompass at a minimum: adequate safe water
and sanitation, adequate food, adequate health care including psychological support,
adequate shelter. All assistance must be carried out in a manner that does not add to the
threat of violence against the assisted population.
Recognize the Red Cross Red Crescent role as auxiliary to government in
humanitarian services and thus will not replace or undermine state responsibilities
where the potential for appropriate state action exists. In addition, it will not normally
replace or duplicate the work that other humanitarian agencies are mandated to carry out.
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Undertake emergency response according to the Fundamental Principles of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent and apply the principles and spirit of the Code of Conduct for the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.
Work within the competence of the Operating National Society and the International
Federation. Rely on, but not be limited by, local capabilities and coping mechanisms.
Programme beneficiaries, men and women, must be meaningfully involved in the
planning and implementation of emergency response.
Base their actions on appropriate disaster preparedness programming and
planning. International Federation emergency response programmes are designed and
implemented to maximize the possibility of beneficiaries speedily returning to their
normal lifestyles, or where this is not possible, to attain a quality of life as free from
external aid as possible.
Work towards self reliance and sustainability of programming by both the Operating
National Society and the assisted population taking into account the long term effect of
emergency assistance on future development opportunities. Operating National Societies
should take responsibility to actively plan and pursue their capacity building during
emergency assistance operations.
Continue until the acute threat to life and health has abated or, in situations of
prolonged threat, until the needs can be more appropriately addressed within the
framework of rehabilitation mechanisms.
Maximize the strategic advantage of the International Federation by 'working as a
Federation' to mobilize all appropriate resources, including the regional structures of
the Federation, while ultimately building on the capacity of the Operating National
Society.
Financial resources
The primary tool for International Federation emergency response fund-raising is the
Emergency Appeal. National Appeals are launched nationally by the National Society
concerned. International Appeals are launched by the Federation Secretariat. The Appeal
process is governed by National Society regulations and, internationally, by the
Principles and Rules for Disaster Relief.
Human resources
Recognizing the vital role of human resources in emergency operations, the International
Federation must ensure the proper identification, placement, retention, development,
support, administration and management of suitably qualified, trained and experienced
personnel to work in the service of the most vulnerable. The International Federation
must, with the National Society concerned, be constantly vigilant to minimize the risk to
the safety and security of volunteers and staff working for the programmes.
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Information resources
The International Federation recognizes data and information as key resources in its
emergency response. It is committed to making the Red Cross and Red Crescent a
reliable and timely source of disaster related information. Information systems will be
designed and implemented in order to maximize:
•the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of emergency response.
•the security and safety of beneficiaries, staff, volunteers and fixed assets.
•the timeliness, accuracy and clarity of reporting and accountability systems.
•the involvement of beneficiaries and local organizations.

Physical resources
International Federation policy dictates that the need for physical resources is well
defined, that quality standards are ensured, that delivery is timely, that stocks are
adequately maintained and distribution controlled.
Physical assets not used in the emergency response programme or surplus to operational
requirements, as the programme scales down, should be deployed to support other
emergency programmes when no longer needed for the emergency at hand, subject to
national government regulation.
Consistent with the above, the impact of local purchase upon the local economy and wellbeing of the population should be assessed to ensure that such actions do not cause undue
harm. Programme officials should refrain from creating duplicate infrastructures when
existing National Society or commercial enterprises can provide the necessary support.

Responsibilities
National Societies and the International Federation have a responsibility to ensure that all
emergency response operations and programmes are carried out in compliance with this
policy; that all staff and volunteers participating in emergency response programmes are
aware of the rationale and details of the policy; and that all relevant governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental partners are adequately informed of this policy.

Obtained from http://www.ifrc.org/who/policy/emergenc.asp
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Appendix I
Thai Red Cross Disaster Relief Services Webpages
Early 2004 Webpage
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Webpage updated in September 2005

Two Webpages: One prior to the tsunami (updated early 2004) and the second webpage
updated September 2005.
The 2004 Webpage was obtained from the TRC Headquarters in Bangkok on March 2,
2006. The 2005 Webpage was obtained from
http://www.redcross.or.th/english/services/disas_menu2.php4
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Appendix J
Interview Questions
General questions asked during each of the three interviews, the emails, and the
meetings:
1. What is the organization of the TRC from the Central level in Bangkok to the
Provincial level in Phang Nga and the community level?
2. What are the disaster communication policies of the Thai Red Cross?
3. What communication networks, both mass communication and interpersonal
communication, were utilized to disseminate messages from the TRC to tsunami
survivors? (Radio, TV, print, internet, loud speakers, grapevine, pamphlets,
brochures, posters, etc.)
4. How did the TRC acquire information about the community needs in the Phang
Nga Province? Who communicated with whom?
5. According to the TRC, were the community needs met?
6. How does the TRC evaluate their effectiveness in disaster communication?
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Appendix K
Official Disaster Communication Policy of the Thai Red Cross
Original Message----From: watcharawaratorn vichitra
To: thandim@aol.com
Sent: Thu, 9 Mar 2006 19:57:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: Re: Government and WHO reports

Dear Tami,
I have followed up the questionaire from the Relief and
Community Health Bureau and send you a draft as follows:

1. Communications policy of The Thai Red Cross Society is
available with or without crisis since TRCS have provincial chapters
and branches down to the district level. Whenever people need help not
only during crisis but also family or individual's difficulties, they
can call on and request for assistance.

2.A. TRC know the needs of disaster victims through RC
chapters and branches and RC Health Stations.

2.B. They learn from our activities whilch ensure them
that we are accountable especially on health problem or disaster
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affected.

3. Yes, Lt. Gen Dr. Amnat Barlee, Director of Relief and
Community Health Bureau, represented the Thai Red Cross Society at the
conference on May 30 and 31, 2005.

However, the above answer will be passed to Mr. Kongsiri for
approval.

With best regards,

Vichitra
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Appendix L
The Code of Conduct: Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes (1995)
1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first
The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental
humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As
members of the international community, we recognize our obligation to provide
humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to
affected populations, is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility. The
prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst
those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian
aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and
without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of
need alone
Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of
the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those
needs. Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of
proportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as
precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the
degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognize the
crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and will ensure that this role
is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes. The implementation of such a
universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners
have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal
access to all disaster victims.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint
Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and
communities. Not withstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or
religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of
the recipients to those opinions. We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of
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assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy
NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate
our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy
of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy. We
will never knowingly - or through negligence - allow ourselves, or our employees, to be
used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for
governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly
humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. We
will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be
driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest
of any particular donor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and
finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognize the independence of
action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we
will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.
5. We shall respect culture and custom
We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and
countries we are working in.
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities
All people and communities - even in disaster - possess capacities as well as
vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local
staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we
will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate. We will place a high priority
on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the
countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should
include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of
relief aid
Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective
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relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are
involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme.
We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation
programmes.
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as
meeting basic needs
All relief actions affect the prospects for long term development, either in a positive or a
negative fashion. Recognizing this, we will strive to implement relief programmes which
actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create
sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the
design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimize the
negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary
dependence upon external aid.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources
We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist
and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable
to both constituencies. All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an
attitude of openness and transparency. We recognize the need to report on our activities,
both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness. We recognize the
obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular
assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open
fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact.
Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in
order to minimize the wasting of valuable resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognize
disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects
Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our
public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the
capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their
vulnerabilities and fears. While we will cooperate with the media in order to enhance
public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take
precedence over the principle of maximizing overall relief assistance. We will avoid
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competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where
such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to
the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.
Obtained from http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JMNB?

